Dimensions of labour market integration among young EU migrant citizens in the UK

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Abstract

Youth migrants are at a double-disadvantage in the labour market, as they face young peoples’ education to employment transition challenges as well as difficulties of foreign labour market entrants. This paper investigates the labour market integration of recent young EU migrant citizens, a legally homogenous group. They are ideal for investigating the degree of integration, the relationship with migrants’ country of origin and the potential effect of the post-2008 economic crisis. Using UK Quarterly Labour Force survey data from 2004-2014, the paper finds a high degree of integration in terms of employment, contrasted by integration into poor quality jobs. Marked country-of-origin associations exist in terms of qualification-occupation mismatches and wages. By contrast no substantial differences pre-/post-crisis seem to exist. Finally, EU youth migrant citizens have a lower probability of claiming welfare benefits. Overall, the stratification of EU youth migrant citizens mirrors their region-of-origin’s relative economic position in Europe.

Keywords: Employment, migration, EU, outsiders, Benefits, country of origin
Acknowledgement

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Introduction

In light of youth unemployment rates exceeding 50% in Spain and Greece as well as high youth unemployment rates in many other Member States (Eurostat 2014), the European Union (EU) initiated a number of employment programs targeted specifically at young people (e.g. Youth Employment Initiative - European Council 2013). Irrespective of these initiatives, the right to freedom of movement within the EU perhaps offers young EU citizens, including jobseekers, more opportunities than the various explicit youth policies. However, increasing migration of mostly European citizens within the EU has not only become politically controversial but also poses questions regarding the ability of EU migrant citizens to integrate in the labour market of the destination country. In light of increasing youth labour market outsiderness across Europe, political debates on the right to freedom of movement within the EU, and the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, we see it as important to investigate the
extent to which young European migrant citizens\(^1\) integrate into the UK labour market and whether this might have been affected by the economic crisis.

Youth migrants face the risks and challenges with regard to labour market integration faced by young people in general as well as those specific to migrants. Labour market outsidersness – inactivity, unemployment, low-income and low employment protection – is increasingly a problem of young people across Europe (Seeleib-Kaiser & Spreckelsen 2016) leading to a “new generation with higher exposure to systematic labour market risks” (Chung et al. 2012, p.301). This particular vulnerability of labour market outsidersness is due in part to the transition from education to employment, that is youth’s labour market entry in face of no or very limited work experience (Brzinsky-Fay 2007; Schmelzer 2008). These challenges are of particular importance in light of potential life-long scaring effects from lack of labour market integration at the beginning of a working life (Schmillen & Umkehrer 2013).

\(^1\)At times the EU uses the term of EU mobile citizens in juxtaposition to TCNs. But this conceptualisation can also be confusing itself, as there are specific categories of mobile citizens, such as posted workers (workers that are posted by their company to work in another Member State for the maximum duration of 2 years) or frontier workers (someone who lives in one Member State and works in another, returning home at least once a week) that differ from workers who have relocated to another Member State. Posted or frontier workers have normally not shifted their ‘habitual residence’ to another Member State. Also students who have moved to another Member State for the sole purpose of pursuing their studies are not in all cases considered to have changed their ‘habitual residence’. Pensioners who spend part of the year in another Member State will also not have changed their residency status. Following the UN definition international migration statistics normally define someone who has moved for more than one year to another country as a ‘migrant’. We define non-national EU citizens habitually resident in another Member State as “EU migrant citizens” and thereby clearly differentiate this group from the group of other EU mobile citizens. This differentiation is also important regarding the potential cost and benefits for national welfare systems, as EU mobile citizens do not have the same access rights to social benefits in another Member State as nationals or EU migrant citizens (who are entitled to these rights after a maximum of five years of residence) or EU workers (whose entitlement starts from the first day of their employment). Jobseekers are normally not entitled to social assistance in the country of destination during the first three months of their residence, but ‘export’ their unemployment benefits from their country of origin for a minimum duration of three months (Bruzelius/Seeleib-Kaiser 2016).
Past research on the UK has found lower wages amongst migrant citizens from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE A8) compared to their European counterparts (Longhi & Rokicka 2012), concurring with particularly large occupation-skill mismatches (Drinkwater et al. 2009; Clark et al. 2014), but advantages in finding and staying in employment prior to 2008 (Demireva & Kesler 2011). With regard to the effects of the economic crisis following 2008 some research indicated a reduction in new migrants from A8 countries by 2011 (McCollum & Findlay 2011) as well as substantial changes in migrants’ wages in the UK (Clark et al. 2014). Little research to date looks at the labour market integration across youth migrants from CEE, Southern Europe, Bulgaria and Romania, and the rest of the EU. – Past research has often focused on single groups of origin, the contrast with non-EU migrants (Demireva 2011), or specific ethnic groups (e.g. Dustmann et al. 2005).

Theoretically, migrants’ challenges to labour market integration potentially result from their (in-)ability to and lack of opportunity for ‘assimilation’ or from discrimination (Nielsen et al. 2004). In addition, the dualization literature (Emmenegger et al. 2012) has highlighted the risks of migrants becoming labour market outsiders, exposed to precarious employment and low wages, whilst insiders are protected through legislation and favourable collective bargaining arrangements. Challenges to labour market integration in terms of income, employment, overqualification and occupational status are well documented for recent immigrants (Altorjai 2013; Demireva 2011; Clark & Lindley 2009; Andrews et al. 2007; Kogan 2006) and even children of immigrants (Heath et al. 2008)². Explanations point to effects from human capital specificity in the country of destination (Chiswick 1978), with migrants unable to ‘export’ their skills (Chiswick & Miller 2009) and employers unwilling to

² However note also empirical literature on the “assimilation hypothesis” finding improvements of migrants labour market situation over time (e.g. Chiswick et al. 2005; Gagliardi & Lemos 2015).
invest into migrants’ skills (Dustmann 1999), and selection effects increasing the number of low-skilled migrants (Borjas 1987). Migrant youth are faced with a double challenge of youth labour market entry and problems associated with assimilation and discrimination.³ In Hoijer’s and Picot’s (2015) words “migrants are by definition labour market entrants” (p. 5 also see Kogan 2006).

This paper analyses the differences in youth labour market outsiderness between UK youth, young EU migrant citizens and young third country national (TCN) migrants. More specifically, we ask: How well are youth migrants integrated into the UK labour market in comparison to their UK peers? Does the degree of integration reflect structural differences between the regions of origin and macroeconomics changes due to the economics crisis after 2008? Overall, the paper will contribute to the discussion on the effects of intra-EU migration and the labour market challenges for young people.

**Contextual factors of youth migration: the UK, EU-origins and the recession**

The above challenges for youth migrants are general in nature. However, youth migrants’ labour market integration will be affected by their specific country of origin and country of destination (van Tubergen et al. 2004). Research has identified the UK labour market to offer comparatively easy access to employment (Algan et al. 2010), which, however, is more likely to be atypical (Ballarino & Panichella 2015). This is often attributed to the more flexible UK labour market (Kogan 2006; Kogan 2007) and the overall characterization of the UK as a liberal market economy (Guzi et al. 2015). Particularly relevant in the context of youth is in addition the focus of the economy on *general skills* (Gangl 2003; Brzinsky-Fay 2007), which

³This question falls into a broader research agenda on connectedness of life course events and migration (cf. Kogan et al. 2011, p.75).
is said to be beneficial for migrants, and should benefit youth migrants in particular. Overall, the UK seems to attract labour migrants mainly into either high-skill/high-pay or low-skill/low-pay jobs (Reyneri & Fullin 2011). However, post-2009 recession increases of unemployment in the UK were particularly concentrated among the youth (Bell & Blanchflower 2010), thus potentially adding an additional burden for young migrants to integrate into the labour market.

Empirical research suggests country of origin effects can be more important to labour market integration than the nature and characteristics of the destination labour market (Fleischmann & Dronkers 2010). Young EU migrant citizens in the UK constitute a ‘homogenous’ analytical category from a legal perspective from the situation relating TCNs, as Member States cannot limit their number, require certain (minimum) skills or discriminate against EU workers with regards to social rights. After five years of residence all EU citizens have the same social rights as British nationals. As EU job seekers can ‘export’ their unemployment benefits from the Member State of origin for a minimum duration of three months (Bruzelius & Seeleib-Kaiser 2016), we would expect a higher reservation wage (Kogan et al. 2011) and, ceteris paribus, a better integration into the labour market, compared to TCNs. However, amongst EU migrant citizens we would expect considerable variation of the reservation wages, given the significant differences between unemployment systems and wage levels (Clasen & Clegg 2011). An indication of this is given by the considerable variation in average reservation wages of youth across the major regions of the EU (See Appendix Table 1). Therefore, we would expect lower wages and lower quality jobs among youth migrant citizens from CEE countries in contrast to youth from the EU-Rest. Overall our expectation is to find a clear stratification of labour market integration by migrant’s region of origin.
Finally, we would expect a decrease in labour market integration of youth migrants since the beginning of the 2008 economic crisis.

Methods

Definitions and measurement

This article analyses youth migrants and their labour market integration. Youth in this context are defined as young people aged 20-34. Migrants are identified by having a different country of birth than the UK, no UK citizenship, being resident in the UK for one year or more, after which one can by and large assume the person is habitually resident, and having arrived in the last 5 years. The focus on recent migrants provides a better opportunity to investigate region-of-origin effects, as these would be less relevant for established migrants who potentially already experienced a catch-up or assimilation with their UK peers; moreover, after five years of residence an EU citizen is entitled to the same social rights as a British national.

The research focuses on six different groups of young people in the UK. Recent youth migrants from: central and eastern Europe (CEE, A8 excluding Croatia: Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.), Bulgaria and

4 The respective variables identifying these in the UK labour force survey are: “Country of origin” CRYO and after 2007 CRYO7 and CRYOX7; “Year of last arrival” CAMEYR2.

5 This has become standard practice and respondents thus identified are called recent migrants (Rienzo 2013). However past work on labour market integration has defined migrants such as on basis of ethnicity and country of birth only.

6 This migrant definition does not distinguish between legal status, e.g. for asylum seekers, those granted asylum, international students; it as been argued that the dataset (QLFS see below) does contain members of these groups as households are sample and despite the exclusion of communal dwellings (Ker et al. 2009).
Romania, Southern European countries (EU-South: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain), remaining European Union countries (EU-Rest: Austria, Benelux, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, \textsuperscript{7} Sweden), and finally migrants from the third countries. These country groupings are theoretically driven: the CEE (A8) countries as well as Bulgaria and Romania (A2) have long been seen as the European migration countries of origin, whilst this has recently also been publically asserted for Southern Europe.\textsuperscript{8} Moreover, the “EU-South” can be identified as a distinct country group in terms of its labour market, economy and welfare system (Ferrera 1996; Ferragina et al. 2015). These migrant groups are compared with \textit{UK youth} and TCNs (aged 20-34).

Our comparisons focus on two time periods: the years between 2004-2009 and 2010-2014. The reasons for this are first the need to achieve a sufficiently large number of observations through pool data; and second more importantly unemployment in the EU significantly increased since the second half of 2008, surpassing the level of 2004, the initial year citizens of CEE countries were granted the freedom of movement to the UK, in 2010 (Eurostat 2015). Thus intra-EU migration in the post-2009 period occurred in a considerably different economic context.

For the purpose of this study labour market integration is defined through a number of indicators: First labour market status according to the ILO definition in terms of employment,

\textsuperscript{7} Young Irish migrants might integrate easier into the UK labour market than other EU-Rest citizens, however amongst this EU-Rest group they are (given the criteria for recent migrant status) only approximately 8\% of the of the sample of EU-Rest citizen.

\textsuperscript{8} Particularly after 2012 media stories on e.g. Spanish youth migration made headlines in UK media, e.g. the Telegraph 2013 “The new Spanish armada is on its way Driven from home in search of work, the number of highly qualified young economic refugees taking menial jobs in Britain is growing” or The Guardian 2013 “Spain’s lost generation of graduates join wave of migrants in search of jobs”. Systematic assessments of these claims have to the authors’ knowledge not been undertaken.
unemployment and inactivity;\(^9\) second in terms of average time worked per week; third average gross hourly wages; fourth whether an employee has a permanent contract and works part- or full-time, and finally the degree of skills-occupation mismatch. As the receipt of welfare benefits among recent EU migrant citizens has been politicized and as social benefits can have a significant effect on the reservation wage, we also assess the uptake of employment-related benefits, such as unemployment benefits. During the first five years of residence EU citizens have only limited access to unemployment or social assistance benefits in the destination Member State.

**The “Average migrant”**

In the following section we present *average proportions or numbers for average young EU migrant citizens*. We do not adjust these numbers for differences in demographic make-up or educational attainment. We deliberately analyse young EU migrant citizens and their UK peers in this way as it reflects the political and public debate, which does distinguish by country of origin, but not by demographic characteristics. More theoretically, this paper is not interested in a migration effect net of other explanations, but rather the situation of a specific demographic group in UK society.

For robustness regarding findings on levels of part-time employment but also wages, we investigate gender differences within and across EU migrant citizen groups. Thereby we take account of the well-known gender differences in these labour market characteristics (for

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\(^9\) According to this definition employed is anyone paid employment, self-employed, family worker or on a government scheme. Unemployed is anyone not employed who is looking for work and available to work. Anyone over the age of 16 not in these categories is classified as inactive cf. (Office for National Statistics 2012).
example Machin & Puhani 2003). Given the smaller sample sizes these analyses should be treated with caution.

**Data and statistical analyses**

The following analyses use data from the United Kingdom Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) (Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit 2015). The QLFS is the largest social survey in the UK, each quarter all adult members from 41,000 randomly selected private households are interviewed in a rotating design. Each household stays in the survey for 5 consecutive quarters. The resulting large samples allow for an analyses of recent youth migrants in a robust and representative way (but note Martí & Ródenas 2007) and is the best dataset available to analyse recent migrants’ labour market situation (for a review on UK data on immigration see Cangiano 2010). We examine respondents from the first wave only to avoid double counting and since these have the highest response rates.

A key challenge is the precision of estimates, as youth migrants are a small proportion of the overall number of respondents. In addition comparison across time and groups make the cell sizes small for simple year-on-year comparisons. Therefore the pre-/post-crisis period data for the years 2004-2009 and 2010-2014 are pooled (Appendix Table 2). The data are analysed

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10 Note, since 2010 there is random selection of households in multiple occupancy, i.e. addresses with several households present, this results in a lower sampling probability of such households which is addressed through a change in survey weighting (cf. Office for National Statistics 2011, p.17). Readers should keep this in mind since it might affect the sampling of migrant households and result in underreporting.

11 Alternatively the Annual Population Survey provides even large sample size, however, with less detail on the respondents characteristics (cf. Ker et al. 2009).

12 This has become standard practice (see e.g. Dustmann et al. 2005; Drinkwater et al. 2009; Demireva 2011).
accounting for sample design (one-stage cluster sample with households as primary sampling units) and weighting. In the subsequent analyses the confidence intervals give an indication of the sampling variability.

The occupation-qualification mismatch is measured in terms of a young person either having a higher, same or lower qualification, compared to the median in her/his occupation group (3-digit SOC) for youth (20-34).

The majority of analyses are estimations of proportions for the respective comparison groups. For comparison of the hourly wages these are reported as change from a base (UK youth between 2004-2009) and estimated as log-hourly wages (cf. with approach taken by Chiswick et al. 2005), adjusted for inflation using CPI (Office for National Statistics 2015). Usual hours worked per week are estimated using a zero-inflated poisson regression accounting for absence from work and illness (Clegg 2012). Finally, probabilities for claiming employment related benefits are estimated using a logit model controlling for respondents (ILO-defined) employment status.

13 Note however, Dustmann (2010) cautions that the LFS's non-response weighting might bias results for migrants since they tend to have different non-response patterns.

14 Measures of skills amongst migrants are limited as the QLFS does not collect detailed information on "foreign qualifications", which is the relevant measure for recent migrants who have not yet acquired UK qualifications. However, the QLFS has a set of measures on the origin of a person qualification: school or university/college etc. (QUALCH11, QUALCH9). From 2009 these are sufficiently detailed and available for migrants for the mismatch analysis. We regard this as a better measure than alternatives, such as "years since left school" (cf. Drinkwater et al. 2009).

15 For an alternative empirical approach see Altorjai (2013), however she uses a different dataset with limitations on sample size and duration.

16 Since we used pooled data to estimate wages for five-year periods we could not use a year-dummy approach to adjust for inflation, as suggested by (Wooldridge 2012).

17 Since employment benefits are legally dependent on specific employment status it necessary to control for these.
The data was analyzed in Stata 14.0 (StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA) using the survey analysis suite (svy), subpopulation estimates were calculated following West et al. (2008).

**Results**

Over the two periods investigated, 2004-2009 and 2010-2014, EU migrant citizens have increased their share amongst all recent migrants, with as expected relative increases amongst migrant citizens from A8 and A2 countries (Figure 1). Notably and despite the economic crisis no relative increase can be observed for migrant citizens from the EU-South compared to the pre-crisis period. To express the uncertainty of the estimates, particularly given the small sample sizes of young migrants subgroups, all results are presented with confidence intervals.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{18}Note confidence intervals for proportions are calculated using logit transformations, and are therefore not symmetric.
Youth migrants dominate amongst recent migrants irrespective of region of origin. On average about 60% of all migrants who arrived in the last 5 years and have lived at least 1 year in the UK are in the age-range of 20-34 years. Notably, in the pre-crisis years this proportion was about 70% amongst recent migrants from CEE, and has dropped in the crisis years after 2009. The overall proportion stands in contrast to UK youth in the same age bracket. They make up about 15.6% of the UK population between 16-75 years, down from 18.7% prior to 2009 (see Figure 2 below).
**Figure 2:** Proportion of young (20-34 years) amongst recent migrants to the UK (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)

![Figure 2: Proportion of young (20-34 years) amongst recent migrants to the UK (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)](image)

**Table 1:** Proportions of female and male youth amongst recent EU migrant citizens by region of origin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>2004-2009 Male % (95% CI)</th>
<th>2010-2014 Male % (95% CI)</th>
<th>Female % (95% CI)</th>
<th>2010-2014 Female % (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK incl. Channel Islands</td>
<td>50.5 (50.2-50.8)</td>
<td>51.4 (51.1-51.8)</td>
<td>49.5 (49.2-49.8)</td>
<td>48.6 (48.2-49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE (A8)</td>
<td>53.8 (52.1-55.5)</td>
<td>48.7 (46.6-50.8)</td>
<td>46.2 (44.5-47.9)</td>
<td>51.3 (49.2-53.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian &amp; Romania (A2)</td>
<td>46.6 (40.2-53.2)</td>
<td>56.0 (50.7-61.1)</td>
<td>53.4 (46.8-59.8)</td>
<td>44.0 (38.9-49.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-South</td>
<td>49.9 (45.4-54.5)</td>
<td>48.9 (42.8-55.1)</td>
<td>50.1 (45.5-54.6)</td>
<td>51.1 (44.9-57.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Rest</td>
<td>49.6 (45.7-53.5)</td>
<td>44.2 (36.8-51.9)</td>
<td>50.4 (46.5-54.3)</td>
<td>55.8 (48.1-63.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Country</td>
<td>50.6 (49.3-51.9)</td>
<td>49.7 (47.5-51.8)</td>
<td>49.4 (48.1-50.7)</td>
<td>50.3 (48.2-52.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Recent migrants:* arrived within last 5 years, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship.

The gender composition of young EU migrant citizens appears to be similar or statistically indistinguishable from their UK peers. One exception pose youth from CEE, who prior to the
2010 were proportionally more male, whilst post-2010 the ratio has reversed and there appear to be more female youth from CEE (see Table 1).

In the following figures the vertical line expresses the confidence intervals for UK youth, for easier comparison. The line-width corresponds to the width of the respective confidence interval.

In terms of employment status no significant differences can be found between young people born in the UK and youth migrants from EU-South countries as well as Bulgarian and Romania (see Figure 3). This contrasts strongly with the situation of migrants from CEE countries, who have on average, higher levels of employment and lower levels of both inactivity and unemployment than their UK peers. By contrast their TCN peers have lower employment and higher inactivity levels. In addition, there seems to be a clear change of these levels in the years after 2009; the differences to UK youth have become more pronounced. Young people from the EU-Rest have statistically significantly higher levels of inactivity with simultaneously lower levels of unemployment than UK youth. Given the ILO classification of employment status this might be attributed to a high number of University students amongst this group.

These crude indicators seem to suggest that young EU migrant citizens in Britain are similarly integrated into the labour market as their UK peers, with CEE migrants showing much higher employment rates.
Figure 3: Employment status (ILO) of recent youth migrants by region of origin (Pre- and Post-2009)

Employed (ILO)

Unemployed (ILO)

Inactive (ILO)

*Horizontal line represents level for the UK with line width equivalent to 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4: Average working hours recent youth migrants in dependent employment, (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)

A striking finding is that young EU migrant citizens from CEE and the EU-Rest on average work significantly longer than their UK peers.\(^\text{19}\) This finding holds both in case of full-time (Figure 4) and part-time employed youth (Appendix Figures 1). These numbers pertain to employed youth only and are thus in their magnitude not affected by the different levels of employment in the respective groups.

When we compare gross hourly wages for young migrants in the UK (Figure 5) stark differences by region of origin are immediately obvious. Young migrant citizens from CEE as well as Bulgaria and Romania have on average lower gross hourly wages than their UK peers.

\(^{19}\) The confidence intervals for all EU migrant groups overlap across regions of origin and over time.
(about 20% less). However, Bulgarian and Romanian EU migrant citizens have higher hourly wages than the CEE peers. This might be due transition arrangements restricting the freedom of movement largely to high-skilled workers and the self-employed from Bulgaria and Romania until the end of 2013. Migrant citizens from the EU-South have an hourly pay comparable to UK youths, whilst the EU-Rest and to a lesser extent TCNs have higher hourly wages. Adjusted for inflation hourly pay for UK youths has increased in the post-2009 period; however, a similar trend for the respective migrants cannot be observed. It is worth noting, that income differences also exist for part-time employed, here again young EU migrant citizens from the CEE region have significantly lower wages, together with TCN youth (see Appendix Figure 2).

**Figure 5:** Differences in gross hourly pay for recent, full-time employed youth migrants and UK youth, (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)

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Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
*Estimates of the logarithm of gross hourly pay (HOURPAY variable) adjusted for CPI (base 2005, source: ONS)
**Line width represents 95% confidence intervals for UK youth

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20 We could also not find significant difference in the changes between the youth groups as separate interaction effects were not significant, see Appendix Table 3.
When looking at the gross hourly wages by gender (Table 2) for full-time employed youth, we only find significant gender pay gaps for UK and CEE youth. Notably, when not distinguishing full- and part-time employees, the expected gender pay gaps exist with one clear exception, i.e. youth from Bulgaria and Romania. They seem not to exhibit gender differentials in their (low) wages. Strictly speaking the same applies for youth from the rest of the world, albeit in a much less clear-cut way (See Appendix Figure 2).

Table 2: Gross hourly pay differences amongst young EU migrant citizens by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male (95% CI)</td>
<td>Female (95% CI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK incl. Channel Islands</td>
<td>100 (100-100)</td>
<td>93.4 (92.61-94.11-105.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE (A8)</td>
<td>67.4 (63.9-70.8)</td>
<td>59 (55.7-62.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria &amp; Romania (A2)</td>
<td>71.2 (60.6-81.8)</td>
<td>67.7 (53.5-81.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-South</td>
<td>101.2 (91.3-111.2)</td>
<td>86.7 (77.5-95.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Rest</td>
<td>125.8 (114.7-136.9)</td>
<td>109.8 (102.3-117.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Country</td>
<td>105 (101.5-108.5)</td>
<td>99.2 (95.2-103.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The following analyses examine whether a job is permanent. Amongst youth in employment, Figure 6 shows significantly higher levels of temporary contracts among all migrant groups, except for A2 migrants, compared to UK youth, which again might be a consequence of the transition arrangements in place until January 2014.
**Figure 6:** Proportions of employed youth with non-permanent contracts, (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)

![Graph showing proportions of employed youth with non-permanent contracts](image)

**Figure 7:** Proportions of employed youth working part-time, (Changes Pre- and Post-2009).

![Graph showing proportions of employed youth working part-time](image)
In keeping with the number of hours worked, EU migrant citizens from CEE, Southern Europe as well as the rest of the EU have lower rates of part-time work than their UK counterparts (Figure 7). This same conclusion for migrants from Bulgaria and Romania is only warranted for the post-2009 cohort. Again, migrants from the rest of the world defined the overall pattern and experience higher levels of part-time work.

Table 3: Part-time employment amongst young EU migrant citizens by gender, (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>2004-2009 Male % (95% CI)</th>
<th>Female % (95% CI)</th>
<th>Male % (95% CI)</th>
<th>Female % (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK incl. Channel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islands</td>
<td>8.2 (7.9-8.4)</td>
<td>32.6 (32.2-33.1)</td>
<td>12.2 (11.7-12.7)</td>
<td>35.7 (35-36.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE (A8)</td>
<td>4.2 (3.1-5.8)</td>
<td>19.6 (17-22.4)</td>
<td>7.4 (5.6-9.8)</td>
<td>24.6 (21.4-28.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria &amp; Romania (A2)</td>
<td>10.2 (4.7-20.7)</td>
<td>36.1 (25.6-48.2)</td>
<td>6.2 (3.3-11.5)</td>
<td>30.3 (22.8-38.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-South</td>
<td>10.8 (7.101-16.)</td>
<td>26.1 (19.8-33.6)</td>
<td>17.6 (10.5-28)</td>
<td>25.5 (17.8-34.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Rest</td>
<td>7.6 (4.7-12)</td>
<td>21.4 (16.6-27)</td>
<td>9.7 (3.8-22.6)</td>
<td>20.9 (14.5-29.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Country</td>
<td>21 (19-23.2)</td>
<td>28 (25.8-30.2)</td>
<td>27.1 (23.6-30.9)</td>
<td>30.2 (26.8-33.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
Estimates based on FTPTWK variable.

As expected, female youth are more likely than male youth to be employed on part-time than full-time contracts (Table 3). Interestingly, this gender gap is statistically no longer distinguishable amongst EU-South, third country youth as well as EU-Rest in the post-crisis period. We do find the same regional stratification of these employment patterns as for the overall results replicated in both gender groups, with for example both male and female CEE youth working less often part-time than their UK male and female peers.

The following analyses regarding qualification are rather rough due to the lack of detailed data for the respective occupation-qualification-migrant-subgroups. Data is only available
from the fourth quarter 2009, and the analyses presented here focus on post-2009 years. Figure 8a shows the proportions of youth migrants who have a *higher* qualification than the median qualification in their occupation group for youth, Figure 8b shows the opposite youth working in occupations with *lower* qualification than those expected from the occupations median, thus for example the median qualification is a college or university qualification but a young person only holds a school certificate.\(^{21}\)

Based on these results there seems to be a *negative* qualification-occupation mismatch for youth migrants from CEE and Bulgaria/Romania. In line with the expectation of a stratification by region, there is some evidence for EU-Rest migrants to having obtained *better* occupations than expected given their qualification, surprisingly this seems also to hold for TCN youth and those from the EU-South.

Some of these differences could be attributed to the sectoral distribution of recent young migrant workers (Appendix Figures 3). Recent young CEE migrant citizens are much more likely than UK nationals to work in manufacturing, whilst young EU migrant citizens from A2 countries are more likely to work in construction, than any other group. Interesting in this context is the large proportion of A2 nationals who work in financial services. This suggests a u-shaped distribution of this EU migrant citizen group over high- and low-pay sectors, which might indicate an effect of the UK transition regime, allowing self-employed (construction workers) and high-skilled EU migrant citizen from A2 countries to work in the UK before full freedom of movement was implemented in January 2014.

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\(^{21}\) This measure is problematic in many ways, as it does not account for qualitative differences in university and college qualifications and does not reflect actual skills. Following Demireva (2011), we could have used ISCED97 educational qualifications however, the UK LFS currently does not provide a more detailed measure of foreign qualifications (see Office for National Statistics 2009, p.251f.) and a majority of recent migrants by our definition only holds a foreign qualification.
**Figure 8a:** Qualification-occupation mismatch of UK youth and recent youth migrants, *higher qualification* (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)

**Figure 8b:** Qualification-occupation mismatch of UK youth and recent youth migrants, *lower qualification* (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)
The following section briefly investigates unemployment benefit receipt. Figure 9 depicts for unemployed youth the probability of actual unemployment benefit uptake. There appears to be a substantially higher probability for claiming unemployment benefits amongst UK youth compared to migrant youth from CEE and TCNs. The probability of benefit uptake for youth from EU-South and EU-Rest was significantly lower pre-2009, however post-2009 the probability is no longer statistically distinguishable. In addition there seems to be a higher probability of claiming unemployment benefits by A8 youth migrants in the post-2009 period.

The reader should note the considerable uncertainty surrounding these findings as most strongly highlighted by the thick blue line expressing the estimate of the probability of a UK youth claiming unemployment benefits. The width of the line indicates this uncertainty in terms of a 95% confidence interval.

Figure 9: Probability of unemployed youth migrant claiming unemployment benefit, (Changes Pre- and Post-2009)
Discussion

Summary

Our data show a shift in the composition of migration from the ‘rest of the world’ towards relative more EU migrant citizens in the UK. Sixty per cent of these recent migrants are between 20 and 34 years. Young EU migrant citizens appear well integrated in terms of employment, with migrants from CEE/Rest of Europe having higher employment rates than their UK peers. Youth migrants work – on average – longer hours than their UK peers, are less likely to work in permanent contracts, with CEE/Rest of Europe also being less likely to have part-time contracts. These variables suggest that migrants are less well integrated into employment in terms of job security and quality. This seems to be a general pattern for EU migrant citizens, in line with past research (Reyneri & Fullin 2011).

By contrast, there seems to be a clear country of origin stratification when it comes to the match of qualifications and occupations as well as pay equality. EU migrant citizens from the Rest of the EU are paid more than their UK peers, and tend to have a better occupation to qualification fit. The opposite appears to be the case for youth migrant citizens from CEE and A2 countries. Interestingly, only a small difference and no qualifications-occupation mismatch seem to exist for Southern Europeans. Although this needs further scrutiny, we speculate that the labour market stratification of EU migrant citizens is very likely the outcome of institutional arrangements within the EU. As Member States can exclude migrant EU jobseekers from the receipt of means-tested social assistance during the first three months of residence and the jobseekers can export unemployment benefits from the country of origin for a minimum duration of three months, the reservation wage of EU migrant jobseekers will differ based on the generosity of the unemployment insurance systems and the wage level in
the country of origin. Based on the much lower wage levels and less generous unemployment schemes in CEE countries, young migrant job seekers from these countries can only export an unemployment benefit, which is very likely to provide them with a reservation wage below the subsistence level. Subsequently, this extremely low reservation wage very likely forces jobseekers arriving from CEE countries without a job offer to take the next best job irrespective of conditions and pay in order to survive, if they cannot rely on other support (Bruzelius & Seeleib-Kaiser 2016).

Our brief analysis with regard to receipt of employment-related benefits seems to suggest that, unemployed youth migrants, more or less irrespective of their region of origin within the EU or globally, have a lower probability of claiming unemployment benefits than UK nationals. This is very much in line with our expectations based on the restrictiveness of means-tested benefits for EU migrant citizens during their first five years of residence.

Finally, across our analyses there seems to be little change other than the compositional change, between the pre-/post- crisis labour market integration of youth migrants.

**Limitations**

There are three key limitations in the present study: A) The sample sizes of the migrant groups studied, a problem that has perpetually hampered research on migrants in the UK (cf. Martí & Ródenas 2007). B) There is likely to be some bias from migrant specific non-response patterns, which will impact on the comparison between migrants and natives. C) Our measure of occupation-qualification mismatch is rather imprecise and crucially does not map skill-mismatches, which arguably are more relevant.

However, the pooling of data has provided us with a reasonably large number of observations even in subpopulations of the respective migrant groups. Furthermore to date little research
exists to the authors’ knowledge investigating migrants’ response patterns, and providing alternative weights for non-response. Finally, compared to existing literature our qualifications-mismatch measure has the advantage to be readily applicable and more precise for recent immigrants than measures of qualifications and skills obtained in the UK, moreover the findings are consistent with previous literature (Altorjai 2013).

Analytically the study is limited in two ways; on the one hand the pooling of years has led to a loss of overtime changes. On the other hand the study is predominately univariate and descriptive of the average migrants. Whilst the former is a practical necessity, with a theoretical reason for the year cut-off, the latter has the advantage to reflect the actual demographic group in the UK, rather than narrowly, for example, investigating a “migration effect”.

**Conclusion**

We set out to investigate the extent to which young EU migrant citizens are integrated into the UK labour market. In short, they are well integrated in terms of employment, but not in terms of job quality job and even less in terms to social protection in case of unemployment.

Furthermore, we wanted to assess whether youth labour market integration was related to the macro-economic changes following the post-2008 crisis and migrants’ country of origin. We did not find compelling evidence for a crisis effect. However, the country of origin, and therefore possibly different welfare regimes with varying degrees of effective ‘exportability’ of unemployment benefits, labour markets and economic situations in countries of origin, seem to be related to the quality of jobs EU youth migrant citizens take or are able to find in
the country of destination. We do find a stratification of young EU migrant citizens’ labour market outcomes by region of origin.

The analyses open up at least two broad and politically relevant questions: First, how do EU migrant citizens deal with the lack of labour market integration or spells of unemployment. A second more cross-national comparative question relates to the country hierarchies in terms of labour market outcomes of young EU migrant citizens in the UK, which raises the question about the stratification of EU citizenship more generally.
Appendix

Appendix 1 – Average weekly working hours amongst part-time employed youth.

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
* Estimates from a zero-inflated poission regression of TOTHRS variable, controlled for illness and temporary absence from work.
** line width represents 95% confidence intervals for the UK
Appendix 2 – Average hourly wages amongst part-time employed youth.

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
*Estimates of the logarithm of gross hourly pay (HOURPAY variable) adjusted for CPI (base 2005, source: ONS)
**Line width represents 95% confidence intervals for UK youth
Appendix 3 – Sector of Employment

Proportion of employed youth working in Agriculture & fishing

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
*Estimates based on INDSECT/IN0792EM variables
**Line width represents 95% confidence intervals for employed UK youth
Proportion of employed youth working in Manufacturing

![Graph showing the proportion of employed youth working in Manufacturing across different regions and years.](image)

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
*Estimates based on INDSECT/IN0792EM variables
**Line width represents 95% confidence intervals for employed UK youth

Proportion of employed youth working in Construction

![Graph showing the proportion of employed youth working in Construction across different regions and years.](image)

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
*Estimates based on INDSECT/IN0792EM variables
**Line width represents 95% confidence intervals for employed UK youth
Proportion of employed youth working in Distribution, hotels & restaurants

Proportion of employed youth working in Transport & communication

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
*Estimates based on INDSECT/IN0792EM variables
**Line width represents 95% confidence intervals for employed UK youth
Proportion of employed youth working in Banking, finance & insurance etc

Proportion of employed youth working in Public admin, education & health

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
*Estimates based on INDSECT/IN0792EM variables
**Line width represents 95% confidence intervals for employed UK youth
Proportion of employed youth working in Other services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UK*</th>
<th>CEE (A8)</th>
<th>Bulgarian (A2)</th>
<th>EU-South</th>
<th>EU-Rest</th>
<th>Third Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Youth migrants: 20-34 years old, country of birth not UK and no UK citizenship, arrived within last 5 years.
*Estimates based on INDSECT/IN0792EM variables
**Line width represents 95% confidence intervals for employed UK youth
### Appendix – Tables

#### Appendix Table 1

Average reservation wages of average wages for youth across the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Net Annual Wage, 67% AW (Euro)*</th>
<th>Net Replacement Rate, single, 67% AW, no children (%)**</th>
<th>Weekly Net Reservation Wage (Euro)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>20103</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>212.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>19812</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>341.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>22429</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>361.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>21712</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>247.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18147</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>241.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>19618</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>221.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>19308</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>184.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>23927</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>348.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>23496</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>284.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>22295</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU-REST</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>252.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11162</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>83.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14649</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>202.9</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
<td>12232</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>91.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9481</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>136.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>14220</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>212.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU-SOUTH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>145.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>6238</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>6448</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>68.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4287</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>55.1</td>
<td>43.4</td>
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<td>49.0</td>
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<td>64.4</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>8455</td>
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<td>139.3</td>
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<td><strong>A8 CEE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>71.2</strong></td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2612</td>
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<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2833</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>32.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:**

*Eurostat: Annual net earnings 67%AW, no children, 2013; Table [earn_nt_net]*


Appendix Table 2

Observations in the pooled QLFS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of recent (last 5 years) youth (20-34) migrants (Country birth &amp; citizenship)</th>
<th>2004-2009</th>
<th>2010-2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK incl. Canal Islands</td>
<td>122318</td>
<td>65159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE (A8)</td>
<td>2210</td>
<td>1699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria &amp; Romania (A2)</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-South</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Rest</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Country</td>
<td>5608</td>
<td>2949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>4335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>131748</td>
<td>75142</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Appendix Table 3

Models for the estimation of the native-migrant wage gap (OLS regression for log-wages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Same changes between pre-/post crisis</th>
<th>Changes pre-/post-crisis varying by group</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>p-value</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-2009 dummy</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant groups</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE (A8)</td>
<td>-0.354</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria &amp; Romania (A2)</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-South</td>
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<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Rest</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Country</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year*Migrant group interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009#CEE</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009#Bulgaria &amp; Romania</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.899</td>
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<td>2009#EU-South</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.508</td>
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<td>2009#EU-Rest</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-90.925</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>N (subpopulation)</td>
<td>13395</td>
<td>13395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.095</td>
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Bibliography


