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ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

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I propose to speak this evening of a few questions concerned with the administration of a great international centre, and to consider some points of experience in Geneva which may arise again in the future. I am afraid that some of you may have hoped to hear something more directly concerned with the great political problems of security and peace. I comfort myself with two reflections: first that many of you may have guessed that a lecturer whose only qualification is to have spent twenty-one years in the Secretariat of the League was perhaps likely to think specially about the administrative side of things; and second that there is not really an absolute line of division between administration and policy, especially in international affairs. Perhaps a much better Secretariat might have saved the League: certainly a much worse one would have crippled it, and prevented the immense development of its activities which did in fact take place.

Although these notes are based on experience, I have found myself all the time thinking also of the future, and of the use which it will be possible to make of conclusions drawn from the past. I must therefore venture for a brief moment into the upper realms of policy in order to explain the assumptions which underlie the modest substance of what I have to say.

I believe that the Covenant of the League of Nations was not only a magnificent conception but a perfectly sound and workable plan: that with American membership the League would almost certainly have ensured the peace of the world for an indefinite time, and that it could in fact have done so even after the defection of the United States.
I believe that its failure was due, not to any fundamental mistakes in its principles, but in the first place to certain political errors and weaknesses on the part of the peace-loving States, and in the second place—and this was the really decisive point—to the fact that it was subjected to the same kind of persistent, subtle, and unprincipled campaign of disruption from within and from without as was later directed against so many States in Europe, and that in this campaign it suffered defeat—a defeat for which we are all now paying the price: for it is no mere coincidence that the States which then conspired against the League—Germany, Italy, and Japan—are those which now stand in arms against the world of freedom. I believe also that if at the end of this war the responsible statesmen again have the will and the power to plan a world-wide organization for peace, the main principles of the Covenant will still prove to be the only ones which can be generally accepted and effectively applied.

But whether or not such a great political reconstruction may be immediately possible, it seems to me quite inevitable—of course excluding the hypothesis of a totalitarian victory—that a great centre of international consultation and organization must be rebuilt after the war. Even if the political functions of such a centre were of the simplest kind, its functions in the various fields of social welfare, economics and finance, transport and communications, colonial development, and the like are certain, as I think, to be very extensive, and to involve the same sort of questions in regard to organization and administration as have existed at Geneva during the last twenty years.

No one doubts that after the war it will be essential to establish or re-establish international organs to deal with those matters which were covered by what were called the technical organizations of the League and by the International Labour Office, and with others such as commercial aviation and radio which unfortunately were not so covered. Yet few seem to have realized that if this be granted we are led automatically to foresee the rebirth of a great international centre. Take even the humble ground of finance. It is much to be hoped that Governments will not repeat after this war the niggardly policy which they so often adopted towards the budget of the League and the International Labour Office—a policy in which unhappily the Delegations of the United Kingdom and other British Commonwealth Members of the League sometimes played a leading part—but will regard it as a good investment to pay what is necessary to make the special staffs of these expert bodies as efficient and as representative as possible. But it is neither probable nor desirable that they should refrain from insisting on the avoidance of useless expenditure, and it would be ridiculous to expect them to bear the cost of a dozen different office establishments, a dozen libraries, translating and interpreting staffs, secretarial and administrative organizations, and so on, each of which to be efficient would involve at least 30–40 per cent. of the cost of a united service. Indeed, the more Governments are ready to spend on the work of each organization, the greater will be the economy in keeping them together; and at the same time the fact of having a central organization common to all will greatly add to their efficiency.

But this simple matter of money leads us inevitably much farther. Practically all Governments manage their finances on the basis of an annual budget; and it follows that the international organs will also have an annual budget, which will clearly be divided into separate votes for each organ with a joint vote for their common central services. This budget will require the approval of each national Treasury, and each Treasury will consult the department concerned before giving its approval. In other words, the budget of the health organization will require the assent—on a basis of world membership—of about sixty Treasuries and sixty Ministries of Health; that of the economic organization will require the assent of sixty Treasuries and sixty Ministries of Commerce, and so on. Here again it is perfectly clear that for efficiency and economy a single meeting at which all these matters will be settled each year will be necessary.
And since no Government will vote funds without having first considered whether it approves the past action and future programme of the organization for which it is asked to pay, this annual meeting is bound to develop into a conference which will discuss the past, and decide the future, of anything up to eight or ten organizations for international co-operation in different fields.

In other words, we shall have as an inevitable minimum an annual meeting which will greatly resemble the Assembly of the League, without its political functions, but exercising its technical, social, and economic functions on a wider scale and with more effective powers than the League, for various reasons, has been able to do up to now.

Finally it seems to me natural to suppose that this centre will be established, and this annual meeting will be held, at Geneva, in the large and convenient building of the League of Nations; and that the participating countries will desire to avail themselves of the magnificent Library of the League, the accumulated archives of the Secretariat, and so far as may at that time be still possible, of the capacities and experience of what remains of the Secretariat itself.

I have spoken of this centre as a minimum: may I add one word more on the question of the organization of Peace? To my mind one of three things must happen: either a world-wide system of disarmament and security will be set up at the same time as the centre; or the workings of the centre will lead on to the setting up of such a system; or else the whole effort will be once more engulfed in war after an interval which this time may be a good deal shorter than twenty years.

But however that may be, I hope I have said enough to explain why it seems to me worth while to consider administrative questions connected with the League not merely as a matter of past history but as containing useful lessons for the future.

In speaking of international administration I do not intend to refer to the special problems of direct international government, such as arose for instance in the Saar territory, but only to those concerned with the organization of an international centre and its relations with participating Governments. It is a large subject, and I fear I can only deal with a few aspects of it. It falls naturally into two main sections, according to whether it is viewed from the view-point of the Governments or from that of the administrative centre. The division can only be a rough one, since not only do the two sides of the question overlap at many points, but the relations of the centre to the unofficial world must also be taken into account. Still, even such a rough division helps to avoid confusion. In order to escape from tiresome circumlocution, I shall not try to avoid speaking of the League and its Secretariat as though they were going to continue to exist in the future. I hope they will, but it must be understood that when referring to the future I mean by these expressions the international centre whose post-war existence I have predicated, and the administrative organization established to serve it.

II. Governments' Relations with the Centre

So far as one could see from Geneva, it seemed that taken over a twenty-year period the most efficient Government organization for League affairs was that of France. (This does not mean that it was the most efficient for the execution of the Covenant.) The French set up a special service to which they gave the name of Service Français de la Société des Nations; its head was always a member of the Diplomatic Service, and the Quai d'Orsay exercised control over it, but it was separately housed and at times developed a modest degree of autonomy. French representatives on the Council and Assembly, Delegates to conferences, members of Committees, &c., were closely in touch with this service and through it with one another, and in general one had the impression of greater cohesion among them than in the case of any other country. In London the work has always been centred in the Foreign Office, and
even there there was never a separate Department for League affairs. In early years there was a committee of representatives of various Government departments concerned with different aspects of the work; it met, if I remember rightly, once a week; but it soon fell into disuse. If the system did in fact work fairly well, this was due to the general efficiency of the British Civil Service, and to the fact that the Foreign Office service was carried on by a series of exceptionally able and energetic officials.

It seems clear that something more is required. The number of departments concerned in League work is very large; it includes the Foreign Office, Treasury, Home Office, Colonial Office, the three Service Departments, the Board of Trade, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Transport, besides the Dominions Office which naturally has to keep itself informed of the policy of the British Commonwealth Members, and the India Office, which by an arrangement which was far from ideal was the sole official channel between Geneva and India in her capacity as a separate Member of the League. The amount of documents and correspondence, official or semi-official, passing between the Secretariat and these offices was very large, and though it is now reduced to a trickle, it will I hope be larger still in the future. Surely all this would justify the establishment of an office which should function separately and not as a small part of one of the departments concerned. There is no reason why its Civil Service head should not be a member of the Foreign Office; indeed this would probably be desirable, on condition that he is allowed to stay on the job and is not merely a mouthpiece of his own service, but is willing and able to keep his office working under its own steam. Though it would not dictate the policy of other departments it would know what each was doing in the international field, keep the various officials or experts concerned in touch with itself and with one another, and make it its business to encourage and help them.

No other Government touches international life at so many points as that of the United Kingdom; but it would certainly be of advantage if other Members of the League, most of whom worked on the same system as London, would also set up their separate directorates for League work. The officials of these directorates should not be frequently changed, as is almost always the case with regular diplomatic posts: they should have time to become familiar with Geneva, the officials of the Secretariat, and their own opposite numbers in other national services. It occasionally happened in recent years that officials holding posts of this kind were sent by their Governments to pass a few months in the Secretariat, and the results were in each case encouraging. It would to my mind be well worth while to include in the League budget an appropriation for the expense of having, say, ten or fifteen such officials seconded every year to spend six months or more in the Secretariat. This arrangement would work to the mutual advantage of the League and the Governments concerned, and would be appreciated particularly by the smaller and more distant Members.

There gradually grew up a more original structure designed to keep Governments in touch with the organs of the League. This was the system of Permanent Delegates. At one time there were more than thirty such Delegates in Geneva besides others in Berne or Paris. Though accredited to no Government, they enjoyed diplomatic privileges under the terms of the Covenant, and constituted a diplomatic corps quite as large as, and a great deal more active than the one which existed in the capital. Most non-Members of the League also established Consulates in Geneva which were really diplomatic offices. This was done by the United States, Brazil, Germany, Italy, and Japan; and the Consuls of the United States and Brazil, whose Governments were pursuing a policy friendly to the League, acted in a manner indistinguishable from that of the Permanent Delegates.

This system presented certain advantages and one danger. It enabled Governments to receive, and the Secretariat to give, full and direct information about
League affairs, including information of a character that might be difficult to put into writing. Conversely it made it easier for Governments to convey to the Secretariat confidential information about their own position and policy and their relations with their neighbours, and in fact for many years the Secretariat was a safe repository of an immense mass of material of this nature. Between it and the Delegations there existed a closer personal relation than between the diplomatic corps and the foreign ministry in any capital. This was due partly to the fact that Delegates were working to a large extent on non-controversial questions; partly to Geneva being a small place where people are inevitably thrown together more than in a big city; but chiefly to the fact that they nearly all had compatriots in the Secretariat, and so had less the feeling of being on different sides of the fence than must exist between a diplomat and an official of the Government to which he is accredited, however cordial their personal relations may be. Frequently also as chairmen or rapporteurs of committees they were doing what was really purely League work without any reference to the particular interests of their Governments. Naturally they were also in close contact with one another and spent much time in the exchange of facts or reports. From time to time they held meetings to discuss their interests as a body under the chairmanship of their doyen, who was the senior in length of service in Geneva without regard to diplomatic rank.

Permanent Delegates were insistent on receiving all possible information for their Governments, and the Secretariat had to promise that nothing should be given to the Press without going to them first. They were authorized to attend all meetings of committees and other bodies unless these were secret in the strict sense of the word.

All this was on the whole useful, but there was always the danger that Governments might be tempted to make their Permanent Delegates, who were almost always professional diplomats, act as their representatives for matters quite outside their individual competence. Especially in the case of distant countries, it was not uncommon to see the same man sitting successively on committees dealing with subjects such as railway transport, the opium traffic, or child welfare, for all of which he had no competence at all, as well as on bodies dealing with political questions, disarmament, and the like which were his proper job. Such a practice was of course quite useless, indeed harmful, both for the committee and for the Government. No doubt economy was the main reason, and this anomaly certainly appeared much more often when the cost of membership of the committee in question was borne by the Governments than when it was met from the budget of the League.

This brings me to a point which I consider will be of great importance for the satisfactory working of international organization in the future. Whatever centre be chosen, it cannot but give a great advantage to those Members who are geographically close to it, unless steps be taken to restore the balance. It was easier and cheaper for France or Germany to send a dozen experts to Geneva than for Argentina or Japan to send one; and a Delegate at Geneva could consult his Government in Paris or Berlin at perhaps one-tenth of what it cost to consult Buenos Aires or Tokio. This inequality could not be eliminated altogether; but it could have been greatly reduced, by making the League budget bear the travelling costs of the Delegations of all Members, and by allowing them the use of the League radio station at cost price. Such an arrangement would have been from the financial point of view merely a partial levelling up of the unfair incidence of the cost of full participation in international activities. It would have involved no new principles—indeed the practice of the League was far from being consistent in this matter. Thus the expenses of the Delegates to the Governing Body of the International Labour Office were paid from the League Budget, while those of Delegates to its annual Conference were borne by their Governments. The cost of Delegations to the Council, Assembly, and all Conferences was borne by the Governments, but in regard to the various standing
committees the practice varied. Naturally those such as
the Mandates Commission which were composed of indi-
vidual experts had their expenses paid from League funds,
while those which were composed of Government repre-
sentatives were regularly but not invariably paid for by
the Governments concerned.

To my mind the proper course would be to include in
the League budget appropriations to cover the travelling
cost of a certain number of Delegates from every Member
for each meeting of the Assembly and the I.L.O. Con-
ference; and to do the same for Council meetings and
meetings of the Governing Body of the I.L.O. for those
States which are Members or are invited to attend. The
same principle should be applied to all the standing com-
mittees of both organizations, and these committees should
be enlarged so as to give all members a chance to take part
in them at reasonably frequent intervals.

The world is growing smaller. Radio, aviation, and
other inventions may be considered from an international
point of view as having changed the nature of space and
time, and demonstrated the impracticability of a continental
organization of the world almost before it had been
suggested. Nevertheless, geographical distance does still
make effective collaboration and mutual comprehension
more difficult, and it should be an important part of the
functions of the international centre to reduce these diffi-
culties to a minimum.

All this would cost money (though much less than one
might think at first sight), but I do strongly believe that
Governments would be very wise to agree to pay relatively
speaking a good deal more for efficient international service
than they have been willing to spend so far, and to act on
the principle that so long as there is no laxity or extrava-
gance—and in this respect the control exercised over
League spending was highly effective, and should be con-
tinued—money spent in the promotion of international
co-operation or in the settlement of international disputes
is well spent, even from the point of view of States not
directly concerned. For example the League was at fault,
as it seems to me, in regard to the cost of special missions
sent at the request of Members of the League to give
advice on administrative or technical problems or appointed
by the Council to help in solving political disputes. Though
the practice was not always consistent, it was usual to expect
the States concerned to pay these expenses: thus Bolivia
and Paraguay were charged with the cost of the Commission
which went out to try to put an end to the Chaco War;
China and Japan paid the cost of the Lytton Commission;
the United Kingdom and Turkey paid that of the Mission
which advised on the frontier settlement between Turkey
and Irak, and so on. It seems to me evident that action
of this sort is of value to all, and that the cost should be
provided from the League budget—more especially since
once again the question of geography comes in, so much
so that similar work in Europe (which cost much less) was
usually, as I remember it, paid for by the League as a
whole. But I would also advocate that assistance and advice
given through the League or the I.L.O. to individual Mem-
bers should as a general rule be regarded as a proper charge
on the common budget. In theory this might be open to
abuse, but to my mind experience shows that Governments
have plenty of self-respect in such matters and may be
trusted not to expose themselves to the reproach of asking
too much.

Much the same considerations apply to the question of
holding meetings away from the centre. This was dis-
couraged both on financial grounds and because the limited
staff of the Secretariat made it very difficult to spare the
extra time for travelling. Governments were more than
ready to issue invitations and provide facilities, but under
the League's financial regulations the inviting Government
was called upon to pay the whole extra cost involved by
holding the meeting outside Geneva. The result was of
course that outside meetings were rare: yet when they
took place their educative value was evident, alike for the
inviting country, the other Delegates, and the Secretariat.
Here, too, it will certainly be wise to adopt a more liberal policy in future.

In passing I should like to say that the common belief that a large number of League Members did not pay their contributions to its budget is unjustified. Though some countries, particularly in Latin America, did under the influence of the great depression go through a period of failing to pay, they mostly picked up again and there were only two or three that were really bad debtors—a fact which is all the more remarkable since the League did not succeed as it ought to have done in linking itself up with the more distant Members. If this can be remedied either in the ways I have suggested or by other methods, I do not believe there will be any difficulty in getting the money, though it may be that the difference between the share paid by the richer and that paid by the poorer Members might have to be widened.

It is true that the submission of the estimate for meeting their contribution to the League budget occasionally gave rise, in certain of the countries most loyal to the League idea, to heated debates. But it rarely if ever seemed probable that the critics would have pressed their opposition to a point where it might have forced their Government to refuse payment and even to leave the League. It may be noted in passing that payment or non-payment was not a matter of policy, and the Governments most hostile to the League paid their dues in full.

I am glad to say that in spite of all the difficulties of the present time a number of Members are still regularly paying their contributions.

III. The Centre's Relations with Governments, &c.

To turn now to the question of relations outward from the centre, the responsibility for these was mainly on the shoulders of the Secretariat. Much discussion is possible about the method of organization and the method of work of the Secretariat. Generally speaking, I find myself think-
permanent chief, unless this undesirable development were forestalled by the appointment of a Secretary-General to whom the expert staffs, the Treasurer, and the central services would alike be administratively subordinate.

Another essential question is whether the Secretariat should have been planned on national or international lines. It is well known that Sir Maurice Hankey, who was invited, and declined, to be the first Secretary-General, was at that time in favour of a system based on that of the inter-allied committees during the war, and of the Peace Conference itself, under which the secretarial work for the Council, the Assembly, or other League organs should be done by the staffs of the various national delegations. Sir Eric Drummond boldly decided to try from the first to organize his staff as an international civil service, each official being supposed to act only on the instructions of the Secretary-General and in the interest of the League, without regard to the policy of his own Government. To many his plan seemed Utopian at the time, but it worked, and though the conduct of individual officials exhibited certain variations, the Secretariat as a whole earned and deserved a reputation for loyalty and impartiality. The credit for this happy result was due in the first place to Sir Eric himself, in the second to the enthusiasm for the League of the members of the Secretariat, and finally to the attitude of the Governments, who for the most part refrained from trying to bring undue influence to bear on their nationals within its ranks. It must be remembered that it was part of the duty of many officials to keep the Secretary-General informed about public opinion and Government policy in their respective countries, and that it is inevitable that any official should as a rule tend to consider that it is in the true interest of the League to accept the views put forward by his own country and so ensure its continued goodwill. If he honestly takes this line, and confines himself to reciprocal explanations between his own Delegation and the Secretariat, his conduct is not to be blamed. No doubt cases occurred where officials went farther than this and used their position to try to induce other Delegations to support that of their own country. In my experience, when this occurred, the official concerned was usually a national of a State under a dictatorial régime, who would have been an excellent member of the Secretariat so long as he was not subjected to unfair pressure. There were many cases where a man continued at considerable risk to be a good member of the Secretariat in defiance of his Government. The conclusion therefore which may confidently be drawn from the twenty years' record of the Secretariat is that a genuinely international civil service is perfectly possible, and that its members will tend of their own accord to bear themselves loyally and correctly so long as they are allowed by their own Governments to do so.

The morale of the Secretariat has come through a heavy test with good credit. Even in the last difficult years it remained on the whole a united body and did not abandon its faith or its efforts. Perhaps I may quote one example: in December 1938 a mission was sent at the request of the Spanish Republican Government to inquire into the presence of foreign troops with its forces. It was not a particularly attractive job and its head-quarters were at Barcelona, which was under very frequent bombardment, but there was strong competition among the members of the Secretariat to be on the staff of the mission. And I should like to pay a tribute to the spirit in which the remaining members at Geneva and in the United States are still working.

The Commission of Inquiry to which I have just referred illustrates another point of great importance, namely how easy it was to get people to undertake work for the League. It was required then to find fifteen or twenty competent persons—mostly soldiers—to conduct the inquiry, and despite the unfavourable circumstances, both material and political, there was no difficulty in doing so. (They received no payment, only an allowance to cover expenses—this was the usual system.) Government representatives or officials were no less willing to serve. The
President of the Council was himself acting as a servant of the international community, and though his position might have been useful to him when a question concerning his own country was discussed he was expected to give up the chair on such occasions to a colleague not directly concerned. I have already mentioned the work done by Permanent Delegates in the general interest. Countless other instances might be quoted—I will allow myself one which I remember with special pleasure. The Mexican Ambassador in Paris was, in 1933–4, Chairman of a Committee which was seeking to restore the peace between Bolivia and Paraguay. Though a very busy man, he told me that whenever his presence at Geneva was called for, if notified by six o’clock on any evening he would take the train that night; and in fact, though it was sometimes impossible to give even such short notice as that, he never failed to carry out the promise.

It would have been desirable to find a place in the Secretariat for at least one official from every Member of the League: but this was not possible for financial reasons. It was also true that some Members could hardly provide candidates as efficient as those from States which possessed a civil service of high training and long experience; and that it was necessary for this reason to take a relatively large proportion of the staff from countries such as Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, not to speak of the Great Powers. It is much to be hoped that this difficulty will not be allowed to reappear; it can be remedied by a moderate increase in the numbers (and of course also the cost) of the Secretariat. Efficiency is after all a relative term, and if we admit, as I think we must, that to keep in touch with the Government and Press of their own country is part of the duty of many officials, we should recognize that only a Ruritanian can do this for Ruritania.

The Secretariat has been criticized for being too official, for limiting its activities too much to relations with Governments and neglecting public opinion. I do not think myself that this criticism has much foundation. It is a very danger-

ous thing for an official organization to try to influence public opinion: it might do a useful piece of work once and again, but on the whole it is likely to engender distrust, and that not only in the minds of the Governments with which it primarily has to deal, but also in the general public itself. Up to the last year or two before the war, when those methods of spreading suspicion and dissension which have proved so tragically successful in Europe were being ruthlessly applied to the League, the Secretariat was trusted, I think I may say by all the Governments, by those of Members, loyal or disloyal to the Covenant, and by those of non-Members also. That trust, earned by years of discretion, was an important asset—would its loss have been compensated even by a successful initiative outside its legitimate sphere of action? and what chance would there have been of such an initiative succeeding?

This is not to say that the members of the Secretariat ought to play a perfectly passive role. There was in fact continuous and extensive exchange of opinions and suggestions between them and Government officials, experts, members of Parliament, societies for various international purposes, including of course those whose object was to promote the League idea, as well as representatives of the Press and private individuals. There is everything to be said for an extension of this practice, and the field which it opens is practically speaking unlimited. But the criticisms to which I have referred were based on the idea that it was the duty of members of the Secretariat openly to oppose the policy even of the Council itself if they judged it to be contrary to the Covenant; and this, whatever their feelings may be, they have no right to do so long as they continue to hold an official position.

In conclusion, it will have been noticed that most of the positive suggestions which I have made would involve an increase in the budget of the League. I should reckon that if they were all agreed to it would involve spending altogether
from two to two and a half times as much as the average expenses of the last twenty years, that is to say about seventy-five million Swiss francs instead of thirty millions. (This figure covers the I.L.O. and The Hague Court as well as the League.) In return for this the League, or whatever other form the post-war international centre may take, would be rendering much more active, continuous, and extensive services to its Members than it was able to do in the past. Every country would be sending a considerable number of its leading citizens to the centre every year, and experience shows that almost all of them would go home as convinced supporters. International committees would increase in number and in size; they would hold frequent meetings away from the centre and so spread the sense of common interests served by it, and a common pride in its achievements. Members would not hesitate to call on the centre to supply expert advice and help. An institution such as the League lives by what it does as much as by what it is. It is quite possible, indeed I believe myself that it is highly probable, that the increase in its prestige and activity which would have resulted merely from doubling its annual budget would have meant the difference between success and failure. For though, when the fortune of war turned against it, its defeat quickly became a disaster, this should not make us believe that defeat was inevitable or that a modest reinforcement might not have given it victory. Such an hypothesis cannot be proved, but if it can be seriously supported it surely makes figures such as I have mentioned look very small indeed.