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No. 27

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND WORLD ORDER

BY
SIR WALTER LAYTON

SIDNEY BALL LECTURE
March 3rd, 1944

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THE WORLD IN FIGURES
# The World in Figures

## Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Industrial Materials</th>
<th>Commerce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latest known date (in millions)</td>
<td>Area (Million square miles)</td>
<td>Density (Population per sq. mile)</td>
<td>Coal* Million metric tons produced in 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD TOTAL</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group I—Big Three</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain and Dominions</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II—China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group III—Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Axis countries (5)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied countries (15)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (4)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group IV—India and Burma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India and Burma</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group V—Rest of World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Independent countries</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (chiefly African)</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Dependent countries</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>20</td>
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* Including limits in equivalent weights of coal.

** In this total, free countries—Norway, France, Holland, Greece and Denmark—earned 12,431,000,000. **

** Ships produced from transactions to British Companies.**

## Key

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<td>Germany and Italy</td>
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<td>Britain and Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
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<td>Gold</td>
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I. IS WORLD ORDER POSSIBLE?

The title of this lecture assumes that it is possible for humanity to achieve something that may be described as "World Order." A few brush aside this assumption with the assertion that "you can never change human nature." Others who have read the history of mankind with more intelligence declare that progress occurs in cycles and that forward movements are often followed by severe and prolonged setbacks. Clearly the past century has been one of very rapid advance. But has not the conflict of ideas and of interests which have brought about the present war unloosed primitive forces which may submerge us? The fear that we are actually slipping backward is very widespread. Count Coudenhove Kalergi, for example, declares that "even after Hitler's defeat and the re-establishment of Western civilisation throughout Europe, mankind will never, within our lifetime, reach the degree of moral unification it had achieved in 1917."

On Going Slow

Many who take a pessimistic view of the possibilities, but hope to save something out of the wreck, depurate any attempt to strive after Utopias. It has been suggested from the United States, for example, that instead of setting up any formal new machinery of international collaboration we should confine ourselves to building on the foundation of arrangements adopted by the United Nations during the war. It will be far easier, so the argument runs, to carry on with joint plans for relief or the allocation of raw materials, to retain and possibly expand the existing machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to regulate shipping, and possibly even civil aviation, than to persuade the American Senate to accept any general political commitment—even if the leaders of the Great Powers could draft one. We may lose all if we try for too much.

I do not accept this view. Even if so limited an objective is the best that we shall in fact achieve at the end of the war, we are not thereby excused from the task of defining our ultimate objective. When a man is in a fog and can only see a few yards ahead, that is the time of all others when he needs to have a clear idea of the destination to which he wants to go and a compass which will guide him on his way.

Moreover, if after the war, we make no serious attempt at fresh progress, we shall miss a very great opportunity. This is a time for greatness.

In contrast to the view that little can be done, I suggest that the end of the war will be a moment when great changes will be possible and will in fact take place. It will depend on the wisdom and courage displayed by the United Nations whether these changes are beneficial or the reverse.

A Changing Era

In a recent broadcast, Sir Lawrence Bragg said that "we are living at the present moment just at the beginning of one of those times when the whole structure of human society undergoes a vast change and reorganisation." It is a change of a kind that may happen at intervals of ten thousand or even a hundred thousand years, and may be likened to a sudden change in the nature of a species of animal or plant. "All the graphs of the scientists," he said,
"after running almost flat for ten thousand years, have suddenly, in the last century, taken a tremendous turn and are still going up steeply."

The effect on human society of the scientific revolution of which Sir Lawrence speaks was forcibly impressed on the mind of Mr. Wendell Willkie during the rapid tour of the world which he made last year and described in his book entitled "One World."

Men and women, he says, all over the world are on the march, physically, intellectually, and spiritually. After centuries of ignorant and dull compliance, hundreds of millions of people in eastern Europe and Asia have opened the books. They are resolved, as we must be, that there is no more place for imperialism within their own society than in the society of nations. The big house on the hill surrounded by mud huts has lost its awesome charm.

Men and women in Russia and China and in the Middle East are conscious now of their own potential strength. They are coming to know that many of the decisions about the future of the world lie in their hands. And they intend that these decisions shall leave the peoples of each nation free from foreign domination, free for economic and spiritual growth.

If this is the true diagnosis, the case for strong action is not only that the opportunity is favourable and may not be repeated, but also that the penalty of inaction may be disaster. Let us, therefore, consider the problem of "World Order," not as an academic exercise but as a matter of the survival of civilisation.

A quarter of a century ago, the experiment of the League of Nations was launched with high hopes. The League's constitution included a small Council of great powers and a few elected states and an Assembly of all the states—large and small—operating on the principle of one nation, one vote. Unfortunately, the League never secured the united support of all the world's great powers and failed to avert the second World War. To-day, many people have gone to the other extreme and are thinking in terms of a world in which three or four Great Powers will exercise a special measure of responsibility for the world as a whole—its peace, its welfare and its freedom. Is this the solution or is it somewhere between?

Counting Heads

Before attempting to answer, let us first clear our minds by recalling the broad outlines of the world as it is. I will begin with numbers.

It may be objected that this is even more unrealistic than the principle of one nation, one vote. True, the American Declaration of Independence declared nearly 170 years ago that "all men are created equal." True, also, that Christianity teaches that every man has an immortal soul whether his skin be white, yellow, brown or black. Yet, in practice, this equality in the sight of God—and of Thomas Jefferson—is more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Some peoples are far advanced materially, culturally and in political capacity; others are backward. As practical men, statesmen cannot treat them all alike. We do not deal with children as we do with adults or expect them to behave as such.

But if Mr. Willkie and Sir Lawrence Bragg are right, the children are growing up.

So I will begin by counting heads.

II. POPULATION.

The world's population amounts to approximately 2,200 million souls.

For my present purpose, this total may be divided into five groups—four are roughly similar in size. The fifth is rather larger.

Group I consists of the Big Three—Russia, U.S.A. and Great Britain plus the self-governing Dominions.* The group is not in any sense a political unit. It merely adds together the population of the three Powers whose voices will chiefly determine the shape of the post-war world. Its population—which is almost entirely white—amounts to nearly 400 millions.

Group II consists of China—the fourth candidate for the status of a Great Power. Her population, including Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet, is believed to be about 460 millions. Even if there is a large error in this estimate, the figure is certainly greater than the combined total of the Big Three.

Group III includes all the peoples of Europe other than Russia and Great Britain. Its population is about 360 millions. Of these, the seven enemy countries—Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland—account for over 160 millions; thirteen occupied countries for nearly 150 millions, and neutral countries for about 50 millions.

Group IV consists of India and Burma with a little over 400 million inhabitants.

I have included the whole of the Rest of the World, with a population of a little less than 600 millions, in a fifth group. It has no common political or geographical basis like the other groups and from the political point of view, it must be sub-divided into two categories—dependent nations and dependent peoples. In the first category are included Latin America with about 125 million inhabitants, Japan (including Korea and Formosa) with 105 millions and the other independent nations of Asia and Africa (mainly the Moslem world) with 115 millions. The second category in this Group V includes all dependent peoples living in controlled territories and in the five Colonial Empires of Britain, France, Holland, Belgium and Portugal. The total population of these dependent countries is about 240 millions.

This analysis is set out in tables appearing at the commencement of this book. The figures are not all of equal value, many of the components are estimates and there are some gaps. But they serve to create a sense of proportion and are displayed in a way which I hope can be easily followed.

The figures, which are largely taken from the League of Nations Statistical Year Book, are the latest available and represent the situation immediately before the war. They take no account of conquests.

It will be noted that the Axis countries, who have challenged the world by their aggression, include only 265 million of the 2,200 million of the inhabitants of the world. But in Europe they have overrun, and are using for their own ends, countries with nearly 150 million inhabitants, while in Asia, Japan has under her control territory containing 285 million people. This makes 700 millions in all. Conquest has put up the Axis percentage from 12 per cent. to 33 per cent.

*It may be questioned whether the Dominions should be included here since they are not parties to the war time discussions that take place between the leaders of Russia, America and Britain. But, after the war, their contact with the British Prime Minister in international affairs will be closer than that of any other nation with either Russia or the United States. This does not apply equally to the dependent Empire or to India, though the resources of these countries play an important part in determining the authority that attaches to the voice of Great Britain.
III. TERRITORY.

I cannot leave these population figures without a brief reference to the territory occupied by the various nations, for the claim for "living space" has played a great part in the propaganda that has led to war. I have, therefore, set out in the second column of the table figures showing the distribution of the land surface of the world. From these figures, an index of the density of population has been calculated.

The Table shows a very uneven distribution of the world's land surface. With less than half the world's population, Groups I and V occupy more than 43 million of the 51 million square miles of land. Groups II, III and IV, i.e., China, Europe and India with more than half the world's population occupy only 8 million square miles.

In the world as a whole the average density is 43 persons to the square mile; but the figures range from 41 per square mile in the British Dominions and 22 in Russia, to 304 in Germany, 420 in Japan and 480 in Great Britain.

At first sight, these great variations may suggest that there is something radically wrong with the distribution of the world's "real estate." But, on second thoughts, this conclusion is not so obvious.

Causes of Unequal Density

The causes of inequality are many. One of them is a physical factor. Vast areas in the world are empty, because they are uninhabitable, and in spite of the advances of science are likely to remain so for a long time to come. In a recent journey across more than half the world, I was struck with the fact that seen from the air, the greater part of the territory we traversed was brown not green. The maps in any physical atlas will show that insufficient or irregular rainfall partly explains the small population of the British Dominions and dependent countries, Latin America, Russia and parts of Africa.

Secondly, complex economic influences are at work. Even if we leave the deserts out of account, the nations with the largest territory per head are by no means the best off. On the contrary, the most densely peopled regions have usually been the most advanced in material welfare and civilization. There is no need to labour the point. During the world-wide crisis of the 1930's, for example, the tide of migration was not from crowded Britain to empty Australia, but was actually in the opposite direction. The story is the same in that other densely peopled country—Japan. In spite of every encouragement, the Japanese stayed at home and failed to colonise Manchuria after 1931. If migration were unrestricted, the tide would set steadily in the direction of countries that are already wealthy and of regions that are economically advanced.

This does not prove that there is nothing in the plea for more living space. The argument has indeed been grossly distorted to buttress up political ambitions. The real purpose of the Axis Powers was, not colonisation, but domination and all the advantages that domination is assumed to bring to those who exercise it.

But in a world where nations impose obstacles to trade and monopolise their natural resources, countries with a growing population and few resources may be made to suffer from a depressed or falling standard of living. In such cases the attempt will be made to acquire territory where mineral or agricultural resources can be exploited and trade fostered with the home country. It is not mere density of population that is the trouble, but insufficient economic opportunity.

Although movements of population after the war are more likely to take place for political than for economic reasons, it may well be that new outlets must be found for certain unduly congested areas, especially where an exceptionally rapid increase of population is taking place.

The Long View

Yet, on a long view, what is needed to cure the trouble is, not mass migration, but a great effort to raise productivity in the land where the populations already live. This means enlisting the aid of science in raising the standard of cultivation and the development of industry and trade. For this there is almost boundless scope. This is a most important field for world co-operation. In the measure that it succeeds, it will permit a levelling up of living standards and an increase of population without resort to war.
IV. POWER.

I have begun with the population figures of the world on the ground that the tremendous changes of these times are tending—much more rapidly than ever before—to make knowledge and the benefits of science universal, and therefore to bring about greater equality between the races of mankind. But the peoples of the earth have not yet attained effective equality of status, still less of power. And whether we like it or not power carries with it responsibility in world affairs.

Population is one of the elements in military strength. But in modern war man-power alone is helpless unless backed by material resources. There is no one test of industrial and economic strength. But, in the Table, I have set out the distribution immediately before the war of the world’s output of the chief industrial materials—viz., coal, steel, iron ore, and oil.

Industrial Materials

The figures show that two-thirds of the world’s population living in Asia, Africa and Latin America, are producing quite trifling proportions of the world’s coal, iron and steel. The only exception is Japan, which produces a moderate quantity of coal and has built up a steel industry on imported ore. Of the countries in Groups I and III, the Dominions, the neutral countries of Europe and Germany’s fighting partners had also only a modest production of industrial materials.

This leaves the overwhelming weight of the basic materials of war industry in the hands of the Big Three: and of Germany and her immediate neighbours. By her occupation of the countries of Europe, Germany has doubled her steel capacity and put her hand on large quantities of ore which are lacking in her own territory. But, even with this addition, the output of the Big Three in 1937 was double that of the whole of Europe. Under the stimulus of war, this ratio has probably risen to three to one.

Oil shows an even greater inequality, with the scales overwhelmingly weighted not only against China and India, but against the Axis, whose only asset in Europe is the relatively small output of Roumania. Outside Europe oil is mainly in the hands of the Big Three but not so exclusively as steel; for there is an appreciable output from Asiatic fields and from Latin America.

All the figures emphasize the overwhelming industrial resources of the United States. Of the other belligerents, Great Britain has coal, a modest amount of ore and no oil. The Dominion resources have only been developed to a small degree. Germany has only coal, and can only partially meet her other requirements with Roumanian oil and French and Swedish ore. Japan is very badly off for ore and has little coal or steel.

Thus the raw materials of industry are highly concentrated.

But if the figures of steel production (which may be taken as a rough index of munition producing capacity) are contrasted with the figures of iron ore production, it is evident that steel production is not necessarily dependent on indigenous raw material but—given sea-power—may also be based upon imports.

Commerce

This brings me to the last of my tables which illustrate the fact that commerce and control of transport are among the constituents of military strength. Three of the five Great Powers which have played a major part in this war, viz., Britain, Germany and Japan, not only get the raw material needed for munition making from abroad, but have built up their whole economy on imports. This is reflected in the trade statistics and in those for merchant shipping. Indeed, ships must be put into the balance sheet, not merely as a means of building up a developed and complex economy, but as a vital constituent of sea-power.

Britain and the British Dominions also have an important commercial asset in the large gold output of the Dominions. Gold production is only one of many elements of financial strength. But I have inserted the figures in order to remind you that financial resources are among the elements which, with shipping and trade, put the British Commonwealth in the short list of the world’s great powers.

Changes in Industrial Power

But here let me strike a note of warning. Certain intangible elements of military strength which nations derive from their history, their traditions and the virtues of their people, may be permanent. Certainly they are largely within their own keeping. But this is not wholly true of material resources. The revolution of which Sir Lawrence Bragg has spoken will inevitably cause the material basis of industrial power to be much more widely spread than in the past. This in turn may change the balance of world power. To think otherwise would be willfully to ignore the lessons even of our own lifetime. General Smuts recently spoke of the decline of France, Germany and Italy. More striking still is the fact that of the six countries which rule dependent peoples in territories covering a quarter of the globe, neither Holland, Belgium or Portugal could, on any definition, be included as Great Powers.

On the other hand, the unification of Germany dates only from the middle of the nineteenth century; the rise of Japan has occurred in the last fifty years; the industrial rise of Russia dates from 1917. From the point of view of the world’s future, the most significant fact of the present war is the demonstration by Japan that an Asiatic country, whose internal resources of raw material are very limited, can exploit modern technique and use science for the purposes of war as well as anybody.

If mere numbers are too crude a basis for world order, industrial power is not a permanent foundation for a world hierarchy; for in the long run industrial power is nobody’s monopoly.

But, in the meantime, power is concentrated in the hands of the Big Three: and this with the prestige of victory will lay upon them the responsibility of taking the initiative in the new chapter that will shortly open.

What kind of order can emerge in the world that I have briefly outlined, and what role will the British Commonwealth play within it?

In answering this question, I do not propose specifically to discuss what should be done with Germany and Japan; but, as will be seen later, the terms to be imposed on them may be greatly influenced by the general framework which is set up.
V. CONSTITUENT GROUPS.

Fate has been kind in selecting the three major powers with whom rests the chief responsibility for initiating peace. They are geographically far apart and, though their economic systems differ radically, it should not be difficult to avoid political clashes in the near or even the more distant future. Like the smaller nations, all three are concerned with their own security. But none of the three has reason, either by temperament or circumstance, to resort to aggression.

The Big Three

Russia will be occupied for a long time in the development of her great territory and has ample room for her growing population.

The United States also still has much development ahead. Such migration that takes place will be inward not outward. She will be much occupied with her industrial technique, and though its influence will be felt all over the world, her peoples have no desire for political domination. Though she may want bases she does not want colonies.

Great Britain has devolved political responsibility on the Dominions and her course is set for doing the same for India and the rest of the Empire. She, too, has no territorial ambitions. All she needs is opportunity for the maintenance of her commerce, freely moving along the sea lanes and air routes of the world and touching the fringes of every continent.

The world can therefore safely assume that these guardians of security will be disinterested and can be trusted to hold the field for the period of transition from war to peace.

But it is a white man’s hegemony, and therefore one which must be shared with other races in process of time. Unless our world order provides for this sharing of responsibility there will one day be a clash between the white and other races.

Other Countries

What of the rest of the world?

China after the war will be faced with a heavy task of organising recovery and economic development. She will also have to settle the constitution of her reconquered territories and the relations between her communists and the rest of the Chinese people. In the world at large, China’s political future will either be that of one of the major units in a new world order or she will become a nucleus around which other Asiatic peoples will gather. Which of these courses she follows will depend on her relations in the near future with the Western world.

India’s economic life has been greatly affected by the world war; but her political status and evolution has perhaps been influenced less than that of any other section of mankind. India has for some time been in a state of transition towards self-government. The war has unfortunately checked this development. But this is transitory, and her evolution, which I shall refer to later, will be resumed.

Among other non-Europeans, several questions of major international policy will arise in addition to the specific case of Japan. The chief ones are;
VI. REGIONAL AGREEMENTS AND A WORLD ASSOCIATION.

This rough survey shows that within each of my main groups and some of the sub-groups there are special problems which are complex, which differ from one another and may involve greater changes in political structure than the relations between the groups themselves. These internal matters need to be resolved before a world association—still more a world government—can fully and freely function.

From this I draw the following conclusions:

(a) The nations of the world are not yet ready to march in step in the development of their political constitutions, their economy or their social structure; nor should we attempt by any kind of international machinery to force uniformity more rapidly than may come about naturally by the interchange of ideas and knowledge. At this stage therefore we should not put into a universal world covenant anything more than simple provisions for security and for consultation.

(b) We should progress towards world order by the regional development of closer relations between nations. The regional arrangements should include the internal security of the groups themselves, political provisions which will foster and guarantee personal liberty and economic collaboration to raise the standard of living. By proceeding on this regional basis, the extent and pace of which will vary from group to group, these arrangements should go much farther than any universal agreement such as that of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(c) Meanwhile, a World Association of a looser kind is necessary for two purposes. One is to keep world peace; the second is to ensure that all regional arrangements are consistent with the interests and progress of the world as a whole and will not break it up into sections whose conflicting aims may contain the seeds of future conflict.

This looser association should as soon as possible be organised under the direction not of a large number of nations sitting in their own sovereign right, but in a council containing representatives of the Great Powers, the large World Groups, Latin America and the Moslem world.

This device will avoid the impossible task of defining what is a nation in a world where sovereignty has an infinite variety of meanings. It will also postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the basing of our world order on the simple counting of heads, though it will distribute authority more in proportion to numbers and power than any other plan would do. This method of appointing the Council of the World Association will powerfully stimulate consolidation of the regional groups.

Within the regions, separate nations will be able to retain their characteristics and internal structure and their cultural development. But they will have security and the economic advantages of a larger unity. I conceive the world of the future as one in which every man and woman will remain a member of their own nation; but at the same time will be conscious of being a member—with certain rights and duties of citizenship—of one of the world's great units or federations.

Is such a conception a possibility? And can the building of it commence now? The answer depends on what happens in Europe. If Europe fails, all fail. If Europe's problem can be solved, there is hope that the problem can be solved everywhere.

VII. EUROPEAN UNITY.

A radical advance towards unity in Europe immediately after the war is necessary for lasting peace. Here, shortly, are some of the reasons:

(i) The anarchic politics of Europe have given rise to two world wars. It is vital not only to Europe, but also to the world, that this anarchy should cease. If we try to put the broken pieces of Europe back into their own little boxes by restoring the sovereign independence of all its separate states, all the old rivalries and suspicions will revive, and if allowed to run riot in the aftermath of war will produce fresh chaos. All prospect of a steady advance towards sanity will be indefinitely postponed.

(ii) Reconstruction will be unduly prolonged if it is left entirely to the efforts of individual countries. It will be much more rapid and based on a sure foundation if it is carried out in co-operation.

(iii) No permanent solution of the boundary questions of Europe is possible so long as boundaries are the limits of an area of absolute sovereignty and the walls of each country's fortress.

(iv) If Europe returns to its pre-war regime, there is also no satisfactory solution of the minorities problem even by the harsh device of a large-scale transfer of populations. This plan, which sharpens up instead of minimising national differences, is quite contrary to the trend of a shrinking world. The problem can only be eased by giving to every citizen definite rights as a European in addition to his national rights.

(v) It is essential that Europe should build up her own internal security. At the outset, the peace will be preserved by the authority of the Big Three. But this is a very provisional measure both for the policemen and for those who are policed. The Great Power have the majority, and a Europe which is not her own guardian will never be truly free. A beginning must be made with the task of preparing a European authority to whom responsibility for security can be handed over.

The Solution lies in some form of federalism which has been described as "the magic word that permits a combination of the little countries with the security of large ones, and the organisation of huge markets without conquest."

Mr. Churchill, in his broadcast address of 21st of March last, described his ideal as the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible without destroying the individual characteristics and traditions of its many ancient and historic races.

Purposes of Federation

I will not attempt here to define in detail the terms of the European Federation or Union. I will only refer to one or two of its purposes:

(i) The security provisions should place all the armed forces of Europe under the European authority or council. The size of these forces—which must be sufficient but not more than sufficient for internal security—and the contributions of the component states, should be fixed by definite agreement. The Powers, who will eventually hand over responsibility for law and order throughout the Continent to the Union, must be parties to the agreement, for these arrangements will be an important factor in world security as well as in the preservation of European peace.
(ii) A European Supreme Court should be set up. One of its functions
would be to settle all matters at issue between the component states.
But it would also have responsibility for safeguarding certain social
and political rights which would be conferred on all Europe by a Bill
of Rights to be embodied in the Act of Confederation. These rights
would be based on the Four Freedoms, and would include the right of
minorities to use their mother tongue as is done in Switzerland. The
Supreme Court and the code which it would enforce is the necessary
safeguard against the recrudescence of tyranny in Europe.

(iii) The scope of the European authority in economic matters cannot
be precisely defined until after discussion between the states concerned.
While it will be important not to endanger the two preceding principles
by attempting too much in the economic field, it is desirable that the
European authority should, as far as possible, exercise control in all
matters of Inter-State Commerce, Supervision of the Munition
Industries and the regulation of Cartels must be within its province.
Both rail and air transport should also be federal subjects, and it would
be practicable and a great advantage to Europe if tasks such as the
distribution of food and raw materials, which at the end of the war will
have to be done by organs of the United Nations, could be continued
and handed over to the new authority. If a scheme of European union
is seriously intended, the operation of these and other United Nations’
boycott should be so organised that it can readily be transferred into
European hands. It was hoped in 1918 that the inter-allied organisations
created during the war could be carried over into peace, but the
opportunity was missed. We may do better this time if the plans
are ready.

America’s experience in federation is not an exact model for Europe. But
in all these matters Europe can draw freely on that experience. Every
European nation is represented in the amalgam which is the United States.
The influence of the descendants of Europeans overseas might be used to
inform and encourage their kinmen in the old world.

The difficulties in the way of such a scheme are many and obvious. But
its achievement is not altogether beyond hope.

Ground for Hope

Resistance to Germany has united the people of the occupied countries in
a common purpose, which will remain for some time as a bond of union. It
is not surprising that the underground movements of many European countries
have expressed themselves strongly in favour of an organisation for Europe
as a whole.

Again, the war has done much to break down the old economic structure.
Hitler has himself introduced by force a sort of economic unity. The horrible
associations of his regime may make men shrink from anything new and
try to revert to their old ways. It would be still better not to restore the old
divisions, but to co-operate on the basis of enlightened self-interest.

Scope of Federation

The scheme should cover all Europe outside Russia and Great Britain.

There have been many, including myself, who in the past have thought that
it would be easier to follow a less ambitious course of building up from smaller
federal groups. I believe to-day, that the only possibility is to start from the
unity of Europe as a whole. One of the reasons for this opinion is that in

the smaller groups local problems and personal considerations loom too large.
Steps towards federation might be taken in the less disturbed areas of the
Continent. In the more difficult regions, sectional schemes will fail. But, in
a larger setting, localised difficulties should be overweighted by the advantage
of ensuring security and wider economic opportunity.

Secondly, it is much more possible to deal with the problem of Germany in
the setting of a United Europe than in one of 25 separate states. Sooner or
later the German people must be admitted in to normal relations with their
neighbours. Within a continental federation it would be possible for the
German people to be divided into more than one state without keeping them
in a condition of economic subjection or creating the urge to smash a settlement
that held no future hope. On the other hand, the provisions of the union
could be such as would prevent a revival of German hegemony more easily
and certainly than under any other plan.

Thirdly, a European Federation should encounter much less objection
from Russia than a federation of a smaller group of states. The latter might
take on the character of an anti-Russian Alliance. This could not be said of
european Federation. In all of its constituent parts there would be elements
friendly to Russia, while at all times the influence of the Western European
States would be used to prevent trouble developing on the Federation’s eastern
frontier. Nor would the argument present itself to Russia as wholly negative.
It was a Russian who preached that peace is indivisible. In the absence of
federation there might be chaos, division and weakness for a time. But in
the long run that would lead to a struggle for power. Russia’s peace would
eventually be endangered by the emergence of one dominating force in a
Continental whose population is twice as large as her own. It should never be
ruffled by the recovery and self-development of a federated Europe. Mr.
Churchill was right when he said of his proposal for European integration
that “All this will, I believe, be found to harmonise with the high permanent
interests of Britain, the United States and Russia.”

Big Three as Sponsors

This brings me to my last point about federation. The scheme needs more
than the passive acquiescence of the Big Three; for no union of Europe is
possible in the near future except under their active sponsorship. They must
share the responsibility, though none of the three should actually be members.
World peace would not be achieved if Europe were taken under the wing of
either Russia or England separately. If these two alone shared the responsi-
bility without the United States it would separate the civilisations of the old
and the new worlds, exclude the greatest industrial country from the role
which would be in effect a grouping of the rest of the white races of mankind and we should
lose the benefit of America’s detachment and experience. With a Union under
the aegis of the three together, no other peoples of the world need fear that
Europe would continue to be a chronic source of war.

Finally, a word about the time table. If, as I believe, such a scheme is
the most realistic and practical way of approaching the peace settlement,
it is important that the lines of European union should be settled in a convention
of the European peoples themselves. Before any final peace is made with Germany.
This means that for some time after the cessation of hostilities, Germany
should be dealt with under terms of armistice which would not prejudice the
distribution of territory or any of the permanent terms of peace. For it is
only when order has been restored, passions have cooled and the definite
outline of Europe as a whole has emerged, that the final terms of lasting peace
can be established.
VIII. THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.

I come, at last, to the role in world affairs of the British Commonwealth and Empire. One quarter of the world’s population is included in these countries which together cover a quarter of the globe. But unlike other major groups, the British countries are widely scattered and their development and status—both political and economic—varies greatly. That is why I have shown the Empire’s four chief components separately in the preceding analysis.

Britain

Great Britain, herself, is a European country. Her history is bound up with the Continent. In this air age she is more closely tied than ever. We cannot avoid taking a hand in European affairs. All other members of the Empire have a very great interest in Europe, for it is important to them that Britain should be secure. But their interest is secondary and indirect. Our link with these distant countries and our sea connections dictate that we should be in close relations with and a sponsor, but not a member, of a European federation.

India

India is in a separate category, not merely because of its size—it contains more people than the whole of Europe and three times as many as the rest of the Empire put together—but also because its political status is in transition. India has been promised the right to decide her own constitution after the war and though she may choose to retain specially close relations with the British Commonwealth, she will be free—if she can agree on the form and means—to choose complete separation. Even if a self-governing India decides to remain in a special association with the British Commonwealth, these relations can never be quite the same as those of the existing Dominions. Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, march with Great Britain, not only because they have so many interests in common, but also because they share a common conception of democracy and a common way of life. We act together without any need to define the basis of agreement because we think the same way about things. We cannot be sure that India will instinctively share the same approach. There are, however, so many matters in which India’s interests and those of the British peoples are the same, that both sides would benefit greatly by India remaining in a specially close association with them.

Whatever the outcome, the promise to India stands of an opportunity to determine her own political future and we must assume that a new constitution will emerge. Indeed, it would be a fatal handicap if no solution were found. Government in India is already difficult; it would become increasingly so. A failure to agree by the chief parties in India which resulted in a constitutional deadlock would have the effect of worsening the relations between England and India and this in turn would make it more difficult for the Western world to establish a working understanding with China and other Asiatic peoples. This is not the place to discuss the details of an Indian settlement. I merely record that without one the task of building up a permanent world order will be much more difficult if not impossible.

Dependent Peoples

The problems of the dependent Empire, though many, are less acute. Great Britain is endeavouring to put into practice the idea of trusteeship of backward people which was enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Under British guidance, these peoples are moving at various paces along the road that leads to self-government.

But a question arises here. Only a few nations control these great territories. The resources already developed are considerable in certain cases, but, on the whole, present production is not very great. The future possibilities are certainly very great indeed. What justification is there for limiting the control of such territories to four or five nations only, three of whom are no longer great powers? The only convincing reply that can be given—if it could truly be said—is firstly that the countries concerned exercise trusteeship for the benefit of the world as a whole and with the world’s consent, and secondly that the established regimes and the policies adopted are the best that can be devised in the interests of the dependent peoples themselves. If the control of colonies is used either to enhance the power or as a source of exclusive profit of the controlling country, the distribution of these great territories between the nations will sooner or later be challenged. And in that event it would be impossible to maintain that there are only five nations competent or worthy to control colonies. To re-distribute them at the end of the war is not feasible and would cause infinite friction and dispute. To lay down now that their distribution should be revised at some future date would be quite illusory. In any case, the fate of the Italian colonies and the Japanese territories has to be decided.

There is no solution of this problem except to agree in principle that all these countries should be regarded as having a special status; that the title to control them should emanate from whatever World Association is set up; and that all colonial powers should undertake to report upon their stewardship and to conduct it on approved principles of political and economic administration. It would be in accordance with Britain’s practice and tradition that she should take the lead in putting forward this proposal.

The Dominions

Lastly, the Dominions. Here the question has been raised whether it is appropriate that they and Great Britain should act more closely together than with other countries and whether this is not a backward step which may check the development of a more universal system of collaboration.

My answer is that within the framework of such a world organisation as I have very roughly outlined, there would be advantage and no harm in close and continuous consultation between Britain and the Dominions. Members of the Commonwealth as a whole are faced with many common problems which are not the same as those which are the major preoccupation of other groups. Questions of trade and of economic evolution, as well as security by the use of sea power, will give many opportunities for co-operative action and for co-ordinated policy which need not exclude participation by other countries—particularly by those maritime peoples who are similarly placed to ourselves. Such co-operation would offer no affront to other countries so long as it is inspired by the idea of toleration—which is and must continue to be the keyword of international democracy.

If there is to be co-ordinated policy, there need be of continuous consultation. But this would not limit the independence of any Dominion, the relations between which will probably always fall short of the Federalism appropriate to the great territorial groups.

British Claim to Leadership

This brings me to my final point. On what ground should we claim for the scattered British Commonwealth the rank of one of the World’s Great Powers and assume the leadership which that rank implies?
Reverting for a moment to the figures which I have given, it will be recalled that the population of Britain and the Dominions is small and will be a falling proportion unless there is a sharp rise in the birth-rate. Our industrial potential also, measured by raw material resources, is not great, and cannot be expected to keep pace with developments elsewhere. It is only in commerce that Britain still leads. Our commercial supremacy is not a historical accident, but springs in part from our geographical position. If you take the globe and divide it—not into eastern and western hemispheres or into north and south—but in such a way that one hemisphere contains the land masses of the world and the other main sea, you will find that the centre of what may be called the “land hemisphere” is London, and that this hemisphere contains 90 per cent. of the land surface of the world. These islands are geographically a natural focus for communication and trade. This central position has shaped British history in the past and will continue to do so in the coming air age.

We should, however, make a grievous error if we imagine that wealth and leadership in commerce are a sufficient or even the main reason that will keep the British Commonwealth in a seat of honour among the Great Powers. In classical and medieval times, the merchants of the City States were not merely traders and colonisers; they were also leaders of civilisation who made contact with knowledge and culture wherever it was to be found. They were the purveyors not only of merchandise but of ideas. That, too, has been Britain’s role. We shall retain a place of honour if we can play it still.

If people of other countries were asked on what ground they look to the British Commonwealth for leadership, their answers would be very varied; but most of them, I think, would include the following points:

Britain’s prestige is high because of what she has done in the second world war, and all countries acknowledge the debt they owe for her endurance when she and the Dominions stood alone in 1940 against an apparently all-conquering Germany. It is not forgotten that the countries of the Empire played a notable part in that resistance. Australian, Indian and New Zealand troops fought by her side when she defended the Egyptian gateway to the East and prevented the Moslem world from being over-run. It was those countries who provisioned and helped to mount the campaign in the Middle East. Tradition, character and courage under inspired leadership gave the world the example it needed at its most dangerous hour.

**A prop to World Order**

But gratitude alone will not last for ever. In a recent editorial in the American magazine “Fortune,” the writer points out that the outposts controlled by Great Britain in various parts of the world were indispensable to the United Nations in fighting their war against aggression.

Without the defense of the Empire — without the bases and the strong points, the strategic crossroads and the half-forgotten isles—Germany and Japan, he says, would have succeeded in splitting apart the world in which America grew to maturity.

America first discovered this dependence in the Atlantic, where we found that not only an impregnable England, but also Caribbean bases, and such unhandy outposts of Empire as Botwood and Gander, Newfoundland, were essential to our safety. When the war swung to the Pacific, Americans found themselves fighting side by side not only with Australians and New Zealanders but with Maoris from New Zealand, Fijians, and Solomon Islanders—all subjects of the British Crown. When

Singapore and Burma went down, India became the indispensable arsenal and base for launching an attack to help China. But perhaps the most dramatic instance of our dependence on the Empire came in the Middle East, which, as all now know, was the linch-pin that held the war in the West and in the East together. For had the Middle East been lost, our one world would have divided into two no less surely than would the Western Hemisphere were Japanese astride the Panama Canal.

Hence, for better or worse, the United States has found that the Empire (so often denounced as the cause of war) proved in fact an indispensable prop to world order.

Russia, too, knows well that it was British sea power which kept open the routes through which aid was sent to her by Britain and America in the time of her own greatest need.

But this appreciation of past services, flattering though it is, is not enough. Our possession of key points guarding the sea communications of the world would not be accepted, but would eventually arouse hostility, if this strategic situation were used for imperialistic ends. The peoples of the world are content to leave these responsibilities with Great Britain because they are satisfied that we are disinterested in our guardianship and that it will promote peace and not aggression.

Such are some of the reasons why the world acknowledges Britain’s claim to greatness. Have we anything else to contribute which will keep us in the forefront of world progress?

**British Ideals**

Many ideas of value to the world have sprung from British soil. These include the democratic devices of Parliamentary government. The British Commonwealth itself has also given a striking example of the free association of independent nations co-operating with complete liberty. It has been the only successful experiment of its kind. We have also worked in the dependent empire towards the ideal of trusteeship for backward peoples, and have sought to help them along the road to ultimate self-government.

When, however, we look to the future, it is important to distinguish the spirit of our ideals from the form. No countries are likely to duplicate the device of the British Commonwealth, for there is no parallel in the world where unity of race and tradition prevails between such scattered states. As for Parliamentary practice, no country has contrived to duplicate our unwritten traditions or apparently understands the rules. We can hardly expect that after the war, our democratic conventions will be exported.

Nor should we imagine that democracy in any stereotyped form will spread to countries where it has not hitherto existed. European civilisation—in Europe itself, in the Americas and in the Dominions—only includes one third of the world’s population. Even of this third a large proportion has contrived to evolve political institutions which are far from democratic. We must not think in terms of “Westminster” government as a world panacea.

But whatever the constitution under which men live, liberty and equality of status and the ideals expressed in the Four Freedoms are goals to which people of every race and colour do aspire.

We shall give the leadership for which the world is looking if we demonstrate in our own domain that these aims can be attained and if we use our great influence in international affairs to assist other nations to achieve them.

For it is these ideas that will unify the world.