The European ‘migrant crisis’ and shifting geographies of Official Development Assistance

Amanda Shriwise and Cecilia Bruzelius

WORKING PAPER 17-02

November 2017
Abstract¹

In recent years, European countries have received asylum-seekers on a scale not seen since World War II. Concurrently, an increasing amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from European countries has been directed ‘inwards’ to cover costs of accommodating asylum seekers and refugees in country. In this paper, we examine how ODA channelling and flows have changed in relation to the arrival of large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and explore the implications of this ‘inward’ turn of ODA for development theory and practice. We argue, first, that a ‘people-centred’ approach to development (as opposed an economic-growth/modernisation approach) is the primary way of understanding ‘development’ in relation to refugees and asylum seekers entering Europe. Thus, development assistance spent in donor countries to accommodate refugees is also understood as a form of transnational social protection. To assess this argument, we use mixed methods, examining changes in the form and flows of ODA by sector in key donor-recipient relationships in the four European countries with the strongest inward turn of ODA – Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy – from 2010 to 2015. Second, we consider to what, if any extent the challenge to long standing geographic divisions between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries brought by this inward turn of ODA has led to change, or a ‘post-colonial turn’, within in development institutions themselves by examining changes to ODA channelling in the same four country cases.

¹ E-mail: amanda.shriwise@spixox.ac.uk.
Introduction

In recent years, European countries have received refugees and asylum-seekers on a scale unseen since World War II (UNHCR, 2016). Funds for the support and protection of people seeking refuge and asylum in rich countries have been counted as Official Development Assistance (ODA) since 1988, despite the fact that ODA has traditionally served as a means of transferring funds from ‘developed’ countries to ‘developing countries’ in order to promote economic development and welfare. Amid the current migration ‘crisis’, an increasing amount of ODA from European countries has been directed ‘inwards’ to cover costs of accommodating asylum seekers and refugees in country. After more than a doubling from 2014 to 2015, the portion of ODA spent in donor countries on asylum seekers and refugees increased by an additional 27 per cent from 2015 to 2016, while aid to the least developed countries dropped by 3.9 per cent (OECD, 2017). Moreover, substantive increases in total ODA spending across European countries can be attributed, in large part, to this increase in inward spending. For example, in 2015 Germany surpassed the United Kingdom as the world’s second largest donor (in absolute terms) behind the United States and in so doing joined a handful of countries to have ever reached the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) target of dedicating 0.7 per cent of gross national income to ODA. However, this change was driven primarily by a 63 per cent increase in spending on accommodating asylum seekers and refugees (OECD, 2017; OECD Stats).
In this paper, we examine how ODA forms, flows, and channelling have changed in relation to the arrival of large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and explore the implications of this ‘inward’ turn of ODA for development theory and practice. We argue, first, that the geographic shift of these asylum seekers and refugees from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ countries pries open a long-standing division within development studies over definitions and approaches to development itself as either: (i) focused on territories and their economies; and (ii) a more ‘people-centred’ variant, focused on human and social wellbeing. Having left their country of origin and its (developing) economy, we argue that a people-centred approach becomes the primary way of understanding ‘development’ in relation to refugees and asylum seekers entering Europe. As such, ODA spent in donor countries to accommodate refugees is also a form of transnational social protection (Levitt et al., 2017), or part of the welfare mix for individuals crossing national boundaries. Using mixed methods, we assess this argument in the four European countries exhibiting the strongest inward turn of ODA – Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy – from 2010 to 2015, looking first at the form that ODA takes in the Refugees in Donor Country sector and at changes in the patterns of ODA allocation across sectors in the recipient countries from which the largest number of refugee and asylum seekers have arrived in each country case.

Second, we consider to what, if any extent the challenge to long standing geographic divisions between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries brought by this inward turn
of ODA has led to change, or a ‘post-colonial turn’, within in development institutions themselves – a type of change that development studies literature tends to overlook (Viterna and Robertson, 2015). In the same four country cases, we examine how large inflows of refugees and asylum seekers into Europe have impacted ODA channelling. We find that while an increasing amount of ODA is being spent inside donor countries, this does not appear to be leading to radical transformations in development assistance in either theory or practice. Instead, domestic institutions beyond flagship development agencies appear to be playing a greater role in channelling ODA.

The paper proceeds first with a discussion of the geographic underpinnings of development policy. Then, it continues with a discussion of the methods used to address the question of how ODA forms, flows, and channelling have changed in relation to the influx of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. Finally, the paper discusses the results before concluding.

The geographic underpinnings of development policy

Scholarship on development policy has long been preoccupied with the iterative exchange between developmental theories, development practice, and examining root causes of developmental problems. The recent movement of asylum seekers and refugees from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ countries challenges two assumptions
inherent in current understandings of development policy: (i) the analytic bifurcation between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (e.g. Go, 2013); and (ii) that ‘development’ takes place inside a national frame, understood here as a meaningful coupling of people and territory. To understand the implications of these challenges for ODA, first, we review traditional geographies of development assistance. Then, we outline two distinct approaches to development theory – economic modernization and ‘human-centred’ – and briefly discuss ways they have been understood as related to each other within the national frame.

First, the very notion of ‘development’ is inextricably linked to geographies of colonialism, and ODA has its roots in colonial development assistance beginning in the 19th century (Shriwise, 2015; Steinmetz, 2008). Post-colonial sociologist (Go, 2013; Bhambra, 2007; Magubane, 2005) highlight the way in which analytic bifurcations, such as the one between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, can be overcome, – in both theory and practice – through relational approaches, emphasizing “…the interactional constitution of social units, process, and practices across space” (Go, 2013, p. 28). Such approaches are key to understanding the ‘donor-recipient’ relationships that both constitute, and are constitutive of, ODA. Here, the particular nature of the movement of asylum seekers and refugees from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ country environments raises questions not only about the extent to which funds are being used within donor countries to accommodate asylum seekers and refugees, but also whether or not (and if
so, to what extent) it is leading to a ‘post-colonial turn’, or a change in the geographic orientation of development institutions themselves – a somewhat neglected area of study in the sociology of development (Viterna and Robertson, 2015). This question is particularly relevant in the context of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, where it has been argued that all countries – not only developing countries – must take steps to help achieve developmental goals and targets through both policy change and implementation and also resource mobilisation to achieve sustainable development (United Nations, 2015).

As both an institution and instrument of development policy, the definition and specific measures of what constitutes ODA are decided at the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). As defined by the DAC, ODA is “… administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective” (OECD, 2017). The ‘economic development and welfare’ objective of ODA echoes the distinction between economic and people-centred approaches to development. Traditionally, ‘development’ was conceived of primarily as economic development, in line with broader efforts to modernise territories (first ‘colonies’, then countries of the ‘Third World’) and expand markets (McCloskey, 2015). For example, the World Bank, among other development actors, continues to assess development according to metrics such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. However, this approach (and its measures) has been challenged by scholars and practitioners arguing
for a more holistic approach focused on human and social development, recognising that economic growth is not necessarily equally distributed and therefore does not necessarily enhance wellbeing for individuals or populations. Furthermore, it has also been argued that wellbeing is best thought of as a prerequisite for, rather than an outcome of economic development (Suhrcke et al., 2006).

Riding political momentum from deep dissatisfaction with the neoliberal structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the 1980s and early 1990s (Jolly, 1991), arguments for ‘human development’ made substantial gains post-Cold War as justifications for development assistance were reformulated (Griffin, 1991). For example, the Human Development Index was introduced, measuring development across a number of dimensions seen as critical for wellbeing, including life expectancy, health, educational attainment, and also GDP per capita (UNDP, 1990). In other words, human development calls for a stronger focus on social goals and objectives. With the last decade’s financial crisis, such goals have gained renewed traction with political consensus building around the need for social protection (G20 Leaders’ Statement, 2009) alongside suggestions of a ‘social turn’ in development assistance as part of efforts to encourage ‘transformative change’ for sustainable development, or “change that reembeds ‘the social’ (social development and equality) as a central objective in national and international policy making” (Utting et al., 2012: 2; UNRISD, 2016).
Notwithstanding their differences, these distinct, but related approaches to development share a tacit assumption that economic, social, and human development objectives are married within the physical and social frame of a nation-state. The large number of asylum seekers and refugees entering Europe challenge this fundamental understanding in two ways: first, through the separation of people and territory as nationals move between countries; and second, by the particular nature of this movement from a ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ country context, thereby leading ODA funds to be channelled inside donor countries themselves in response. Alongside their exit from the social ‘container’ of the nation-state, these individuals are thus disconnected from more place-bound, material notions of economic development. Therefore, we hypothesize that in such cases, ODA is by default guided by a ‘people-centred’ approach – both in how it is distributed and the form that it takes.

For this reason, ODA channelled inwards is also viewed as a form of transnational social protection, defined as the ‘policies, programmes, people, organizations, and institutions which provide for and protect individuals in... a transnational manner’ (Levitt et al. 2017, p. 6). Notably then, the individuals who have left a developing country context can still benefit from ODA in a developed country context, illustrating the way in which a people-centred approach toward development allows both development and wellbeing to be understood as both embedded within, yet also able to transcend, geographic location. At the same time, however, the transnational social protection character that
ODA assumes when spent in donor countries to accommodate refugees also has an individual tint to it (as is indeed the focus of the transnational social protection perspective more generally): even if protecting the individual, any *redirection* of ODA from developing countries may have implications for investment in social development in both the developing country of origin and the country in which individuals seek refuge and asylum, *raising questions about the impacts of ODA on the well-being of populations*.

In sum, is this inward turn in ODA simply a case of a human-centred development, where ODA is flowing to persons from developing countries rather than strictly to territories designated as ‘developing’, and if so, what are the social implications of this change? Also, is this inward turn post-colonial in nature, challenging the traditional geographic orientation of development institutions themselves? In the next section, we outline the methods used to address these questions.
Methods

Research question and operationalization methods

In this paper, we address the following research question: How have ODA forms, flows, and channelling changed in relation to the influx of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe? In particular, we are interested in understanding the significance of this event by assessing its impact on development policy, both in theory and practice. More specifically, we want to explore the implications of recent changes on: a) development understood as territorially bound to developing countries; b) development understood as human/social wellbeing and economic development; c) development assistance being channelled and defined through a specific set of institutions. Through empirical examination, we examine first the form that ODA takes and how the geography of the flows has changed in key donor-recipient relationships in relation to the large increase in refugees and asylum seekers entering Europe from 2010-15. Then, we examine the channels used to facilitate the inward turn of ODA in response to this increase.

Data collection and case selection

Given the exploratory nature of this work, the data collection, case selection, and preliminary analysis evolved though an ongoing, iterative process.

Sources
We use data from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which tracks ODA contributions, and also data from Eurostat on the number of asylum seekers entering European countries. These sources were used to identify the time period for examination, to select country cases and to collect the data for each case.

**Data quality: ODA as a measure**

As defined by the DAC, ODA is comprised of grants or loans offered at concessional rates to countries and territories on the ‘DAC List of ODA Recipients’ (i.e. ‘developing countries’), which are ‘administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective’ (OECD, 2017). Furthermore, the measures used to assess ODA are determined by the DAC, and reporting of ODA figures are left to each donor country.\(^2\)

It should be noted that there is substantial variation in how donors calculate and report costs related to accommodating asylum seekers and refugees, and as a result, the OECD reports this data with the caveat that it is not necessarily comparable (OECD 2016, p. 2). Occasionally, countries choose not to report costs of accommodating Refugees in Donor Countries sector to the OECD, as in the case of Poland in 2014 (despite having reported

---

\(^2\) To encourage accountability and transparency in reporting, peer reviews of each DAC member’s development assistance programs are undertaken approximately every five years by two fellow members of the DAC, with support from the DAC/OECD secretariat. The data reported by DAC members is now recorded down to the project level in the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Database, which we draw from here.
these costs in previous years) (OECD 2016, p. 4). Nonetheless, in so far as the resources go towards the process of accommodating refugees and asylum-seekers, the measure (the substantive content of which we will discuss later in the ‘Findings’ section), is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. Moreover, we are interested primarily in the nature of the donor-recipient relationships rather than strictly in a comparison of donors.

Time period examined

As illustrated in Figure 1, the increase in the number of asylum seekers entering Europe began as early as 2011, with the majority of the increase occurring from 2013 to 2015. Therefore, the time period from 2010-2015 was considered in the analysis to understand changes before and after the increase, with special attention to shifts from 2013-2015.

---

3 Currently, the EU (a member of the DAC in its own right apart from the individual membership of EU Member States on the DAC), has also chosen not to report these figures to the OECD (OECD 2016, p. 11).
Figure 1: Top ten European countries receiving asylum seekers, 2010-2015 (Source: Eurostat)
**Donor country case selection**

Since the data from the OECD is not fit for comparison, we chose to look more in depth at the country cases accounting for the largest proportion of the increase in spending within the Refugee in Donor Countries sector of ODA. As illustrated in Figure 2, the four countries selected are Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy. From 2013 to 2015, these four country cases account for approximately 80 per cent of the increase in spending in this sector from DAC countries.

**Figure 2: Top ten European countries spending ODA in the ‘Refugees in Donor Country’ sector (Source: OECD CRS Database)**
It should be noted that there appears to be a relatively weak correlation between the number of asylum seekers and refugees entering European countries and ODA spending in the Refugees in Donor Countries sector. For example, the Netherlands came in tenth in terms of inflows of asylum seekers and refugees from 2013 to 2015 despite coming in third in terms of ODA spending by 2015.\(^4\)

To consider the context of each country case, the OECD CRS Database was used to collect data on each of the four donor country’s ODA flows by sector from 2010 to 2015. ODA sectors include: Social Infrastructure and Services, Economic Infrastructure and Services, Production Sectors, Multi-Sector/Cross-Cutting, Commodity Aid/General Programme Assistance, Action Relating to Debt, Humanitarian Aid, Administrative Costs of Donors, Refugees in Countries, and Unallocated/Unspecified. Within the Refugees in Donor Countries sector specifically, we examined the form of ODA took, its flows by sector, and the way in which it was channelled according to the five coding categories provided by the OECD – public sector, NGOs and civil society, public-private partnerships (PPPs) and networks, multilateral organizations, and other.\(^5\)

\(^4\) In contrast, neither France nor Hungary, which came in third and fourth respectively in terms of the number of refugees and asylum seekers taken in, show substantial changes in ODA spending in this area.

\(^5\) Our understanding is that the OECD codes channelling data first according to being ‘multilateral’ or not. In which case, funding sent from donor countries to multilateral organizations might later be channelled through a national or an international NGO, but this would be up to the multilateral organization to report to the OECD (as there is no way for the donor country to know, or at least it is not their responsibility to report for ODA purposes, how these funds are spent within another organization after they have been disbursed). Therefore, the categories of public sector, NGOs and civil society, PPPs and
Donor-recipient country case selection

First, the Eurostat Database was used to examine the country of origin of the asylum seekers entering these four countries from 2010 to 2015. Across the European region, the country of origin of the majority of asylum seekers and refugees was Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (IOM, 2016), and the donor-recipient relationships between these three countries of origin and the four donor countries identified above were all examined for the sake of consistency and possible comparison. Furthermore, the top three countries of origin for asylum seekers and refugees from 2010 to 2015 were identified in each of the four country cases, and where they differed from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (as in the case of Italy, for example), additional donor-recipient relationships were considered as well (Table 1). Then, data on the donor-recipient relationships for the 16 cases identified was collected from the OECD CRS database.
Table 1: Top country of origin of migrants seeking asylum in countries spending the most on ODA in the ‘Refugees in Donor Country’ sector*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GERMANY</th>
<th>SWEDEN</th>
<th>THE NETHERLANDS</th>
<th>ITALY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Afghanistan</td>
<td>(7) Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(15) Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(16) Syria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: The numbers in parentheses indicate the country rank in terms of country of origin of migrants seeking asylum from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria when not part of the top three.

Data analysis and synthesis

Currently, the OECD’s CRS database depicts funding according to the territory in which it is disbursed or received. For example, when looking at Germany’s donor spending profile, spending across sectors, including the Refugees in Donor Countries sector, appears. However, if one looks at Germany’s ODA spending related to a particular
recipient country (for instance, Syria), nothing appears in the Refugees in Donor Countries sector – despite the fact that Germany is spending a substantial sum to support Syrians seeking asylum within Germany. To adjust for this, we calculated the percentage of refugees arriving in (continuing with the previous example) Germany from the each of the countries of origin of interest, for example Syria for each year from 2010 to 2015. Next, we multiplied this percentage by the total ODA spent by the given receiving country, in this case Germany, in the Refugees in Donor Countries sector (the underlying assumption being that donor countries – in this case, Germany – are spending an equal sum on each asylum seeker, regardless of country of origin)\(^6\). Then, we incorporated these figures into the donor-recipient profile of, say Germany and Syria, to create a more complete, ‘people-centred’ depiction of shifts in ODA not only within the country of say, Syria, but that also considers development assistance allocated to Syrian nationals now located in Germany. This analysis was performed for the 16 donor-recipient relationships identified above.

\(^6\) Most donor countries calculate the ODA share going towards refugees on donor countries based on complex calculations that “require input from several different sources and need to rely on estimates for certain quantities, such as the time spent by refugees on support, the costs for various programmes benefiting various populations, the share of new arrivals of asylum seekers originating from ODA countries and the share of asylum seekers that are granted status.” (OECD, 2016).
When data analysis was complete, the results were written up according to ODA forms, flows, and channels for each of the four donor countries, as presented in the following section.

Findings

Forms of ODA: ODA as transnational social protection

First, the form of ODA spending to accommodating refugees within donor countries provides evidence supports our characterization of ‘economic’ and ‘people-centred’ approaches to development and our suggestion that the latter serves as the touchstone for what is meant by ‘development’ in relation to asylum seekers ad refugees. The statistical directive to count spending on accommodating refugees within donor countries as ODA was introduced in 1988 and has changed little since (OECD, 2016). The directive stipulates that reporting should include:

... expenditures for the sustenance of refugees in donor countries during the first twelve months of their stay. This includes payments for refugees’ transport to the host country and temporary sustenance (food, shelter and training) ... expenditures on deportation or other forcible measures to repatriate refugees should not be counted as ODA. Amounts spent to promote the integration of refugees into the economy of the donor country, or resettle them elsewhere than in a developing country, are also excluded” (OECD 2016, p. 2, authors’ emphasis).
The types of expenditures included in the category of Refugees in Donor Countries vary between countries, but essentially mimic basic social protection provision for these populations:

Apart from essential temporary sustenance provisions such as food, clothing and accommodation, the type of assistance programmes included by members in their ODA also differ e.g. professional training and resettling refugees in municipalities, administrative costs and police, interpretation and counseling. Based on the survey, temporary costs for allowances, food, medical care, training, interpretation, counseling, etc. absorbed about a third of total costs and costs related to resettling refugees in municipalities another third. Costs for temporary accommodation, costs in reception centres and administrative costs together made up a third of total costs... Costs of voluntary return to home country represented 1% of total costs. Only Austria Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland included them. (OECD 2016, p. 4)

More specifically, in Germany, we found that ODA in the Refugee in Donor Country sector included costs for food, accommodation, education, and medical treatment in their calculation of in-country ODA (Venro, 2016). In Sweden, ODA in this sector includes the cost of administrating asylum applications, providing accommodation, and also economic support as needed. In the case of The Netherlands, ODA in this sector went toward supporting asylum seekers broadly and also to subsidising their voluntary return and re-integration in countries of origin. In Italy, ODA in this sector went
primarily to reception centres, rehabilitation, resilience, and integration of migrants experiencing vulnerability, and to the integration and socio-economic inclusion of migrants. By 2015, services for refugees and asylum seekers in Italy were combined at the local level to create the System of Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR), with the primary objective of supporting “... each individual in the reception system, through implementation of an individual programme designed to enable that person to regain a sense of independence, and thus enable effective involvement in life in Italy, in terms of employment and housing integration, access to local services, social interaction and scholastic integration for minors” (SPRAR, 2017).

**ODA Flows: Key donor-recipient relationships of Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, and Italy**

Across these 16 key donor-recipient relationships, ODA dedicated to refugees and asylum seekers in donor countries accounted for the vast majority of ODA delivered between these countries and their nationals from 2010 to 2015 in approximately 75 per cent of the cases. Furthermore, there was little evidence of a replacement effect, where ODA formerly directed to other sectors potentially falling under the heading of transnational social protection, such as the Humanitarian Aid or Social Infrastructure and Services sectors, was redirected ‘inwards’ to accommodate refugees and asylum
seekers. In several of the cases, ODA in the Refugee in Donor Countries sector showed a dramatic increase, where little funding had previously been given to these countries at all.
Figure 3: Total ODA profiles of Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, and Italy by sector, 2010-2015 (Source: OECD Stats)

Legend
- Social Infrastructure & Services
- Economic Infrastructure & Services
- Production Sectors
- Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting
- Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance
- Action Relating to Debt
- Humanitarian Aid
- Administrative Costs of Donors
- Refugees in Donor Countries
- Unallocated / Unspecified
**Germany**

From 2010 to 2015, Germany spent more on total ODA than Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy combined, and its total ODA spending increased during all six of these years. Unlike in the other three country cases examined here, ODA directed towards refugees and asylum seekers in Germany was outpaced by ODA spending in both the social and economic infrastructure and services sectors, during the time examined (Figure 3). However, ODA spending directed towards refugees in Germany increased at a faster rate than in the social or economic sectors from 2014 to 2015, accounting for 63 per cent of Germany’s absolute increase in total ODA between these years (Figure 3).

In Germany, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq are the largest countries of origin of asylum seekers and refugees. At the same time as Germany has increased ODA allocated to accommodate refugees and asylum seekers, Germany has by and large continued spending in other sectors in these three countries of origin (Figure 4). In the cases of Syria and Iraq, Germany has increased spending on Humanitarian Aid alongside spending in the Refugees in Donor Countries sector. However, in the case of Afghanistan, a potential displacement effect can however be observed, as spending in the social sector has declined with the increase in spending in the Refugee in Donor Countries sector. Nevertheless, as of 2015, the majority of German ODA to nationals of each of the three countries has been spent inside Germany to accommodate refugees and asylum seekers.
Figure 4: German ODA to Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis, 2010-2015 (Source: OECD Stats)
Sweden

From 2010 until approximately 2013, Swedish ODA was directed primarily toward the Social Infrastructure and Services sector. However, from 2013 to 2015, ODA in the Refugees in Donor Countries sector increased dramatically, far outpacing spending in other sectors by 2015 (Figure 3).

The largest countries of origin of asylum seekers and refugees in Sweden are Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. As of 2015, Swedish ODA dedicated toward accommodating asylum seekers and refugees in Sweden accounts, by far, for the largest portion of ODA dedicated to each of the three countries and their nationals; no less than 97 percent of ODA related to Syria, 86 per cent of ODA related to Afghanistan, and 93 per cent of ODA related to Iraq has gone to individuals from these countries in Sweden (Figure 5). Moreover, the ODA spent towards accommodating individuals from these developing countries in Sweden account for a very substantive increase in spending related to each of these countries. As such, we can also notice how spending related to Syria has increased significantly with the spending in-donor country on refugees.
The Netherlands

Since 2010, Dutch ODA was directed primarily toward the Social infrastructure and Services sector. However, from 2013 to 2015, ODA in the Refugees in Donor Countries sector increased dramatically, rising to nearly the same level as ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector (Figure 3).

As of 2015, Dutch ODA dedicated toward accommodating asylum seekers and refugees in The Netherlands accounts for the largest portion of ODA dedicated to all four of these countries and their nationals. Furthermore, with the possible exception of Afghanistan, Dutch ODA dedicated toward accommodating asylum seekers and refugees from these countries does not appear to have displaced aid flows to these territories, as the Dutch had only dedicated small amounts of ODA towards these territories in the first place. This effect is seen most extremely in Eritrea, where all of the Dutch ODA affecting Eritrea and its nationals has gone toward accommodating its refugees and asylum seekers in The Netherlands. In the remainder of cases, after accommodating refugees and asylum seekers in country, Dutch ODA was directed primarily towards the Social Infrastructure and Services sector and the Humanitarian Aid sector. This effect was particularly pronounced in Afghanistan, where the Dutch have allocated a more substantial amount of ODA to the Social Infrastructure and Services sector consistently since 2010.
Figure 6: Dutch ODA to Syrians, Eritreans, Afghans, and Iraqis, 2010-2015 (Source: OECD Stats)
Italy

Since 2012, Italian ODA was directed primarily toward the Refugees in Donor Countries sector, with the Social Infrastructure and Services sector receiving the second largest allocation of funds (Figure 3). Unlike in Germany, Sweden, and The Netherlands, the predominant countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers in Italy are Nigeria, Pakistan, and Mali (Table 1).

Overall, Italian ODA dedicated towards accommodating asylum seekers and refugees in Italy was the predominant sector of funding in the cases of Nigeria, Pakistan, and Mali. In the case of Nigeria, 99 per cent of all Italian ODA was dedicated to asylum seekers and refugees in Italy; for Mali, the same figure is 95 per cent (Figure 7). In contrast, in the case of Pakistan, ODA provided in both the Humanitarian Aid and Action on Debt Relief sectors were also notable at various points, despite increased spending on Pakistanis in-country. In the case of Afghanistan, the Refugees in Donor Countries sector rose to become the dominant ODA sector since 2010, but was outpaced in 2015 by an increase in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector.

In the cases of Iraq and Syria, residual combinations of ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services, Humanitarian Aid, and Refugees in Donor Countries sectors were utilised, with an additional increase in Italian ODA to Productive Sectors in Iraq from 2014 to 2015. In contrast to our other donor-country cases, large parts of Italian ODA to Syria
were spent in the Social Infrastructure and Services sector (just over a quarter of ODA), and ODA for refugees and asylum seekers within Italy accounted only for a third of total ODA. In the case of Afghanistan, ODA in the Refugees in Donor Countries sector accounted for the largest portion of Italian ODA to Afghans since 2012 until it was outpaced by spending within the Social Infrastructure and Services sector in 2015 (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Italian ODA to Nigerians, Pakistanis, Malians, Afghans, Iraqis, and Syrians 2010-2015 (Source: OECD Stats)
ODA channelling: evidence of a post-colonial turn?

As illustrated in table 2, an overwhelming proportion (+99 per cent) of funds in all four cases were channelled through public institutions. However, the mix of institutions involved in the process differed between the countries. In Germany and Sweden, pre-existing domestic institutional channels for supporting refugees and asylum seekers were utilised, while both The Netherlands and Italy also called on a mix of intergovernmental organisations, including the IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WHO and also occasionally on NGOs, for assistance.

Table 2: ODA in ‘Refugees in Donor Countries’ sector channeling across four country cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Public sector</th>
<th>NGOs and civil society</th>
<th>PPPs and networks</th>
<th>Multilateral organisations</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germany

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development is responsible for the distribution of ODA. However, German in-country ODA is
channelled exclusively through public institutions (Figure 8), presumably to the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, which oversees asylum and refugee reception and service provision for migrants in their first years after arrival.

**Sweden**

In Sweden, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the distribution of ODA spending in-country on refugees and asylum seekers. However, from 2013 to 2015, the Ministry channelled all ODA spending in-country through the public sector to the Swedish Migration Agency (Figure 8). The Migration Agency oversees the reception of asylum seekers from the point of application until a decision on asylum has been made (Swedish Government, 2016), including administrating asylum applications, providing accommodation, and economic support as needed.

**The Netherlands**

In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is listed as the agency responsible for the distribution of ODA spending in-country on refugees and asylum seekers, and its priorities include “cooperation with authorities and host communities in the reception of refugees; engaging diaspora in the development of their home countries; and promoting voluntary return and reintegration” (IOM 2016) From 2013 to 2015, Dutch ODA spending in-country on refugees and asylum seekers was channelled almost completely through the public sector (Figure 8). In 2015, the Dutch government
partnered with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to support the voluntary return of migrants, accounting for just over one third of its public funding (36.9 per cent) in this area.

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs also channelled some funds, albeit a very small portion, multilaterally to the IOM and in one instance in 2013, to the United National Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Funding channelled to the IOM went toward supporting the return (both voluntary and in the event that one’s application for asylum was unsuccessful) and reintegration of asylum seekers and also toward family re-unification of ex-asylum seekers. Funding channelled toward UNHCR went toward strengthening institutional capacity in receiving areas and also toward the cost of shelter for refugees, though the project description suggests that these funds were spent in Lebanon, not in the Netherlands.

In 2013 and 2014, the Netherlands also channelled funds through some NGOs and civil society organisations focused primarily on capacity building, supporting diaspora communities in opening small businesses and creating platforms through which they can function as development actors, as both funders, usually through sending remittances, and also as political actors, ensuring that their voice is heard and considered in the creation of development policy.


**Italy**

In Italy, the government’s central administration is the agency responsible for the distribution of ODA in the majority of cases, with local administration listed as the responsible agency in only a few cases. From 2013 to 2015, Italian ODA spending in-country on donors and refugees was channelled primarily through the public sector (Figure 8). The Italian government also funded reception centres and translation services utilised by UNHCR and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

Italy also gave residual amounts of funding to multilateral organisations and to NGOs and civil society organisations. Through multilateral channels, Italy provided funding both to the IOM and to the World Health Organisation (WHO). In the case of the IOM, Italy provided support to Moldova and Morocco in 2013. In Moldova, Italy supported the implementation of the European Commission’s Readmission Agreements, facilitating the voluntary return of third country nationals and stateless persons along the journey from origin, during transit, and upon arrival the destination. In Morocco, Italy supported IOM efforts to provide e-learning on guidance services for integration in advance of departure and arrival in Italy. From 2013 to 2014, Italy also channelled funds to WHO for the Public Health Aspects of Migration in Europe (PHAME) project, “…which was created as a response to the growing awareness that the health challenges that migration poses at national, subnational and local levels cannot be solved by traditional approaches in medicine” (WHO, 2014). The project aims “…to provide
technical assistance to Member States in order to fill potential gaps in health service delivery, including in prevention, diagnostics, monitoring and management of disease and to provide policy recommendations for enhanced preparedness and response, with special attention to emergency-related influxes of migrants to different European countries” (WHO, 2014).

Italy moreover channelled funds through NGOs and civil society organisations to support and welcome to refugees and asylum seekers. In particular, it provided funding to Mediterranean Hope, a project of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in Italy (Mediterranean Hope, 2017) to support patrolling in the Strait of Sicily along human trafficking routes, the opening of an Observatory on migration in Lampedusa, the organization of a welcome centre with legal advice in the Sicily Region, and also the establishment of humanitarian corridors, including the arrangement of humanitarian visas to allow refugees and asylum seekers experiencing extreme vulnerability to travel to Italy by plane rather than sea.

Discussion

A closer examination of ODA forms, flows, and channelling in these four cases reveals similarities and differences that inform our questions on whether and how changes in
ODA in response to the migrant crisis might be affecting development, both in theory and practice.

First, regarding the geographic orientation of development assistance, the overwhelming focus on channelling ODA through public institutions suggests little evidence of change, or a ‘post-colonial turn’, in development institutions themselves as a result of this inward turn in ODA in response to the large number of refugees and asylum seekers entering Europe. This appears to be because: (i) from a global perspective, the economies and welfare systems taking in refugees and asylum seekers countries are comparatively strong, eliminating the need for an ‘inward turn’ or re-orientation of development institutions; and (ii) the ability of nation boundaries to be housed not only in geography and territory but also in people and institutions (Sassen, 2006), which enables refugees and asylum seekers to be located within a country without being incorporated or integrated (however fully or not) into the national economy or welfare system until an asylum decision has been made.

Instead, ODA funds to accommodate asylum seekers and refugees in donor countries seem to have been dedicated, in part, to enhancing the institutional capacity for processing, protecting, and providing for refugees and asylum seekers – or in other words, to strengthening ODA channels in donor countries. On the one hand, the investment in increasing institutional capacity could have spill over benefits for other
constituents in the donor country in the short-, medium-, and long-term, particularly where these investments have been made within institutions traditionally overseeing domestic welfare provision. However, when funds are channelled away from countries of origin they can no longer aid in building institutional capacity and engaging development partners with needed technical expertise in these locations. As such, we see how migration can generate new forms of inequalities (Faist, 2014).

However, there were some instances where it was clear that one-off or temporary ‘inward turns’ in ODA channelling had occurred. For example, intergovernmental organisations appear to be well-, if not better placed to offer technical assistance, particularly in the area of overseeing the return of asylum seekers and refugees (voluntary or otherwise) and assisting with family reunification. NGOs – as we saw in the case of the Netherlands – also played a unique role in supporting diaspora communities and in helping asylum seekers and refugees get connected to both formal and informal sources of social support.

Second, concerning the distinction between human-wellbeing or economic development, it was clear that ODA came primarily in the form of transnational social protection. However, one finding in the case of The Netherlands suggested that while social protection has become the predominant developmental focus in relation to the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees, its people-centred concerns are not fully decoupled from
economic development. The Netherlands offers support to asylum seekers and refugees trying to open small businesses and find employment. Furthermore, it is widely known that remittances now outstrip ODA by a substantial margin; hence, the ability of individuals granted asylum to connect to the labour market may have important effects on economic development within their countries of origin. In this way, asylum seekers may contribute to the development of developing countries under the protection of welfare states in developed countries. However, it should be noted that their ability to do so appears to be determined less by the fact that they are located in a developed country and more by the degree to which they are integrated into that country’s economic and social systems—again, with important implications for equity.

Furthermore, and in the context of the economic and people-centred distinction of development, we found little evidence of a geographic displacement effect as a result of development assistance ‘following the people’ when looking at changes in ODA channelling between donor and recipient countries. In the majority of cases, ODA to the nationals of recipient countries (that were the predominant countries of origin of asylum seekers and refugees) showed an overall increase in ODA as a result of outward migration and the associated in-donor country spending. Notably, this occurred also where there was previously little or any development assistance flowing into the territory (e.g. in the case of Sweden-Syria). Furthermore, the majority of refugees and asylum seekers are received in developing countries in close proximity to their country
of origin, such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (IOM, 2015), which also influences ODA allocations and shapes the development of social protection systems. Overall, this suggests that the idea of a displacement effect in ODA is too simplistic, and that a deeper, more complex understanding of the relationship between migration patterns, the development of social protection systems, and ODA allocations is needed.

Regarding the relationship between people and territory, it could be argued that larger volumes of ODA should be delivered to the recipient countries examined to reduce what can be assumed, mostly, to be involuntary migration. On the other hand, several of the ODA recipient countries examined here as predominant countries of origin of asylum seekers – Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq – have all experienced conflict in recent years, calling into the question their ability to effectively absorb development assistance in the first place. Certainly, the examination of the ODA profiles in these donor-recipient cases illustrates the degree to which they are fundamentally affected by conflict through the repeated appearance of combinations of ODA in the Social Infrastructure and Services, Humanitarian Aid, and Refugees in Donor Countries sectors – again, with the latter sector emerging most dominant in ODA allocation by a substantial margin in most cases. The lack of development assistance entering countries such as Syria and Iraq is, perhaps, unsurprising given that it is difficult to invest in social infrastructure and services and to deliver humanitarian aid when security conditions simply do not allow. These countries are emblematic of what Duffield (2001) refers to as the ‘development-
security nexus’, where it is impossible to have development without security, but equally, security conditions may continue to deteriorate in the absence of development.

**Conclusion**

Through the lens of the recent trend of ODA being spent within European ODA donor countries to accommodate refugees and asylum-seekers, this paper has sought to highlight how the relationship between economic development and human wellbeing maps out geographically. We have claimed, and found support for the idea that, development in the context of asylum-seekers and refugees arriving from developing/ODA recipient countries in developed/ODA donor countries can be understood primarily as people-centred and focused largely on transnational social protection. The paper has thus also demonstrated the complexities inherent in drawing distinctions between developing and developed territories and subjects of either.

Finally, the paper has hinted at numerous venues for further research. For example: what does the channelling of ODA through developed country’s public institutions imply for the definition of ODA and development more generally? What do these findings tell us about the institutional structures of asylum-seekers’ and refugees’ social resource environments? And what does the non-correlation between intake of
refugees and in-wards channelling of ODA in donor countries tell us about domestic politics of development?
References


