Vlandas, T. and Halikiopoulou, D. (2021) “Moderating the ‘insecurity effect’? Social risks, Welfare State Policies and Far Right Party Support in Western Europe”, West European Politics. [PDF]
This article examines the interplay between social risks, welfare state policies and far right voting. Distinguishing between compensatory and protective policies and using data from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and social policy datasets, the article tests a range of hypotheses about the extent to which welfare state policies moderate the insecurities that drive particular social groups to vote for the far right. Empirical findings confirm theoretical expectations that several welfare state policies reduce the likelihood of supporting the far right among individuals exposed to high risks including the unemployed, pensioners, low-income workers, employees on temporary contracts, individuals in large families, and individuals who are disabled/permanently sick. These findings suggest that in order to understand why some individuals vote for the far right, one should not only focus on their risk-driven grievances, but also on policies that may moderate these risks.
Halikiopoulou, D., Stockemer, D., and Vlandas, T. (2020) “‘Birds of a feather’? Assessing the prevalence of anti-immigration attitudes among the far-right electorate”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies [PDF]
This article focuses on the prevalence of anti-immigration attitudes among the far-right electorate. Drawing on the distinction between the predictive power of immigration concerns, and the question of how widespread these concerns are among the far-right voter pool, we proceed in two steps. First, we assess the extent to which anti-immigration attitudes are a necessary condition for voting far right; and second we examine whether far right voters with different levels of anti-immigration attitudes exhibit similar individual and attitudinal characteristics. Using data from the 8th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) we find that, surprisingly, anti-immigration attitudes are not a necessary condition for voting for the far right as approximately one third of far-right voters have no concerns over immigration. We further show that far-right voters with different levels of immigration concerns have different profiles when it comes to other predictors of the far right-vote including ideological affinity, attachment to the EU and government satisfaction. Our contribution is significant as we suggest that there are different routes to voting for the far right by groups with different grievances, including non- immigration related.
Halikiopoulou, D. and Vlandas, T. (2020) “When economic and cultural interests align: the anti-immigration voter coalitions driving far right party success in Europe” European Political Science Review [PDF]
This article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis and against the economic grievance thesis. We argue that far right party success depends on the ability to mobilise a coalition of interests between their core supporters, i.e. voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the, often, larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from 8 rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.
Halikoupoulou, D. and Vlandas, T. (2018) “What is new and what is nationalist about Europe’s new nationalism? Explaining the rise of the far right in Europe”. Nations and Nationalism [PDF]
Political parties pledging to speak on behalf of the ‘pure people’, restore national sovereignty, ‘take back control’ from supra-national institutions and promote the ‘national preference’ through strict immigration and citizenship policies are often described as part of a phenomenon termed ‘the new nationalism’ (Economist 2016). In other words, this phenomenon, understood as fairly new and uniform, is characterised by the rise of parties whose key features include nationalism and populism. Examples include the French Front National (FN) (now Rassemblement National), the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), the Austrian Party for Freedom (FPÖ), the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) and the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) whose populist-nationalist platforms have allowed them to mobilise voters, significantly increasing support in domestic electoral arenas. In 2017 these parties performed well, often occupying first, second or third place and in some cases joining governing coalitions (see figure 1). This trend was continued in 2018. During the March 2018 Italian elections, the Lega Nord (LN) occupied third place with 17.69% of the votes cast and subsequently formed a populist coalition government with the Five Start Movement (M5S). This phenomenon is often understood as the product of a ‘cultural backlash’ caused by immigration within the context of a new transnational cleavage (Inglehart and Norris 2016). The argument is that within the context of this cleavage, value orientations have become the key drivers of voting behavior, pitting those with universalist beliefs against those who reject multiculturalism and seek to preserve the established value consensus and traditional ways of life.
Vlandas, T. and Halikiopoulou, D. (2018) “Does unemployment matter? Economic insecurity, labour market policies and the far right vote in Europe”. European Political Science [PDF]
Political parties pledging to speak on behalf of the ‘pure people’, restore national sovereignty, ‘take back control’ from supra-national institutions and promote the ‘national preference’ through strict immigration and citizenship policies are often described as part of a phenomenon termed ‘the new nationalism’ (Economist 2016). In other words, this phenomenon, understood as fairly new and uniform, is characterised by the rise of parties whose key features include nationalism and populism. Examples include the French Front National (FN) (now Rassemblement National), the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), the Austrian Party for Freedom (FPÖ), the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) and the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) whose populist-nationalist platforms have allowed them to mobilise voters, significantly increasing support in domestic electoral arenas. In 2017 these parties performed well, often occupying first, second or third place and in some cases joining governing coalitions (see figure 1). This trend was continued in 2018. During the March 2018 Italian elections, the Lega Nord (LN) occupied third place with 17.69% of the votes cast and subsequently formed a populist coalition government with the Five Start Movement (M5S). This phenomenon is often understood as the product of a ‘cultural backlash’ caused by immigration within the context of a new transnational cleavage (Inglehart and Norris 2016). The argument is that within the context of this cleavage, value orientations have become the key drivers of voting behavior, pitting those with universalist beliefs against those who reject multiculturalism and seek to preserve the established value consensus and traditional ways of life.
Halikiopoulou, D. and Vlandas, T. (2016) “Risks, Costs and Labour Markets: Explaining Far Right-Wing Party Success in European Parliament Elections” Journal of Common Market Studies [PDF]
Does the economy affect patterns of far-right party support across countries? This article reconceptualizes micro-level analyses that focus on the effect of unemployment through a framework of costs, risks and the mediating role of labour market institutions. It then derives several hypotheses and tests them on the results of the previous three EP elections in all EU Member States. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far-right party support at the national level. By contrast, labour market institutions influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far-right party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far-right party support in some European countries that experienced the severity of the 2008 eurozone crisis.
Vlandas, T. and Halikiopoulou, D. (2016) “Why far right parties do well at times of crisis: bringing labour marker institutions back in the debate” European Trade Union Institute working paper [PDF]
The far right is on the rise in many western and eastern European countries. The 2008 Eurozone crisis is an obvious source of blame for this phenomenon; indeed, a large body of literature suggests that economic malaise prompts support for far right parties. This conventional wisdom, however, is not consistent with cross-national patterns of unemployment and far right votes in the last three European Parliament (EP) elections. To solve this puzzle, we argue that it is specific labour market policies rather than the economic crisis itself that are more likely to facilitate the rise of the far right. In many countries over the past three decades, governments have deregulated employment protection legislation (EPL) and reduced unemployment benefits; but it was precisely these labour market institutions that offered protection from the insecurity and deprivation that economic malaise imposes on societies. We test our hypothesis on the last three EP elections and find that unemployment and GDP growth have not played a role in far right support, while labour market institutions have had an impact that is both direct and indirect, by limiting the effect of unemployment. Studying unemployment benefits also revealed a similar phenomenon of direct and indirect correlation: where unemployment benefits are generous, unemployment has no association with the far right, but where they are not, unemployment correlates with higher far right support. Employment protection legislation has only an indirect association that is conditional on unemployment benefits. Where unemployment benefits are low, EPL mediates the impact of unemployment, but where unemployment benefits are generous, there is no mediating impact of EPL. This suggests that the policies of austerity are likely to intensify support for the far right in EP elections, therefore undermining the European integration project itself.
Halikiopoulou, D. and Vlandas, (2015) “The Rise of the Far Right in Debtor and Creditor European Countries: The Case of European Parliament Elections” The Political Quarterly [PDF]
Does the economy affect patterns of far-right party support across countries? This article reconceptualizes micro-level analyses that focus on the effect of unemployment through a framework of costs, risks and the mediating role of labour market institutions. It then derives several hypotheses and tests them on the results of the previous three EP elections in all EU Member States. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far-right party support at the national level. By contrast, labour market institutions influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far-right party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far-right party support in some European countries that experienced the severity of the 2008 eurozone crisis.
